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ABSTRACT: Cases involving attire, hairstyles, names, or manners of speaking
have increasingly attracted the attention of constitutional and socio-legal
scholars. No longer viewed as marginal or esoteric, claims about the
significance of a person's self-presentation are now recognized as testing the
limits of basic constitutional principles. Employing an overarching perspective
that analyzes appearance cases outside of their doctrinal context, I argue that a
legal inquiry focusing on whether a plaintiffs appearance accurately and stably
reflects his or her identity is flawed, since it relies on unattainable conceptions
of the nature of identity and the meaning created by appearance. Diverging
from current legal scholarship, which treats appearance cases only in the
context of minority rights, I suggest that appearance adjudication should shift
its focus from inquiring about the extent to which the appearance is connected
to its bearer's identity to inquiring about the significance of appearance to his
or her personhood. This shift reflects the notion that the vulnerability and
complexity of appearance are part of the universal human experience and not
just the plight of minorities. Such a normative shift will produce a more
adequate legal treatment of claims regarding the personal and social
significance of appearance. Developing an alternative theoretical framework, I
propose understanding appearance as the poetics of personhood. Both in
appearance and in poetry, the medium is inherent to the meaning it creates, and
thus both appearance and poetry are hard to rearticulate in categorical or non-
figurative language. My approach can transform the legal discourse from
considering "identity" in the abstract to accommodating the experiences,
voices, and interactions of concrete, embodied individuals, who may not
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always be able to articulate a rational justification for their appearance, but are
still certain of its central role in their personhood.
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In 1936, Herman Cohen petitioned a Connecticut court asking that his
name be changed to Albert Connelly. The Superior Court of Connecticut
denied his request, stating, "Each race has its virtues and faults and men
consider these in their relations with one another. The applicant would be
traveling under false color, so to speak, if his request were granted."'
'
This Article shows that the principle leading to this decision still guides
courts today: a need to maintain a social order in which people's appearance
conforms with what the court perceives them "to be." At play here is a theory
of the appropriate relationship between one's identity and one's self-
presentation. According to this rationale, a Jew should have a Jewish name and
should be prevented from purporting to appear otherwise.
2
Part I of this Article describes the problem with which this Article is
concerned by analyzing contemporary appearance cases and establishing the
futility of the law's approach to identity as an appearance claim. Part II is
normative, outlining new principles for an alternative legal approach to
personal appearance. Part III is applicative. It revisits the cases discussed in the
first Part and shows how the suggested legal principles would apply to them.
A. Appearance Cases
Cases involving attires, hairstyles, names, or manners of speaking
increasingly attract the attention of constitutional and socio-legal scholars. A
sex-based discrimination claim of a man fired for his long hair, a religious
freedom claim of a female Muslim student wearing a headscarf to school, or a
Black woman's claim that should not be required to change her cornrow
hairstyle because it is. part of her racial identity, are no longer viewed as
1. In re Cohen, 4 Conn. Supp. 342, 343 (1936). 1 became aware of this case in reading Ellen Jean
Dannin, Proposal for a Model Name Act, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 153, 165 n.80 (1976). The judge
added that the Jewish race surely also has its advantages and blessings: "Patently the applicant would
lose the respect of Gentile and Jew alike by such a move. He resides with his mother and several
brothers and sisters who have retained the name of Cohen .... [The court does not believe that] the
change would be advantageous in the end, either to the applicant or his fellows." In re Cohen, 4 Conn.
Supp. at 343.
2. Anti-Semitic sentiments prevalent in the 1930s probably played a role in this ruling. But, as this
Article shows, each period has its anxieties about the identity boundaries that should be kept clear and
thus anxiety about blurring the line between the races is but one instance of a more persistent legal logic.
For example, just as courts in the thirties protected the boundary between Jewish and Christian identity,
courts in the seventies worried about the boundary between femininity and masculinity, and dismissed
sex discrimination claims of men who were forbidden from growing long hair. See, e.g., Karr v.
Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 618 (5th Cir. 1972) (rejecting the sex discrimination claim of a male high school
student asked to cut his hair). As the cases discussed in this Article demonstrate, courts today reflect an
anxiety not so much about blurring the lines between the genders, but about blurring the lines between
the sexes and between sexual orientations.
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marginal or esoteric. Instead, they are recognized as testing the limits of basic
constitutional principles.
This Article shows that the legal view that people's names, dress, or other
personal markers 3 should correlate with their identity still governs the caselaw
today. I seek to develop an alternative legal approach to "appearance"
adjudication.4 Albeit not always conveyed as explicitly as in Cohen, courts
reveal unsympathetic sentiments toward vague appearances that allegedly
decrease the legibility of a legal subject's identity. Accordingly, women should
look feminine, male cross-dressers should be allowed to wear women's dresses
provided they are indeed clinically diagnosed as cross-dressers, and Black
employees should be allowed to sport an unusual hairstyle only if it is tightly
linked to their racial identity.5
This legal approach, I argue, is both unwarranted and unattainable. I base
my argument on the following two propositions. First, unlike jars of jam, which
should be correctly labeled in order to protect consumers, there is no
compelling interest that people be "marked" correctly. Second, even if the idea
that social actors' identities should be easily and securely decipherable seems at
first appealing, this vision of the social world is oppressive, unresponsive to the
dynamic interplay between identity and appearance, and inapplicable given the
complex nature of appearance.
In submitting his appeal, the name-change applicant in Cohen attempted to
convey that his self-presentation impeded his success in the America of his
6time. By raising issues such as attire or hairstyle, the plaintiffs in the cases I
3. The term "markers" suggests that the characteristics I am interested in are intermediately located
between chosen and unchosen characteristics, or between mutable and immutable traits. We can be
marked by a scar from an accident, but we can also mark our skin with a tattoo. A marker can thus refer
both to deliberate signs and to traces of our biology, culture, or experience. That is, it can be both
something that we "put on"-a jacket we choose for an interview to signal professionalism, a
deliberately high-class pronunciation to get good service-and unchosen evidence of our background,
such as our accent, the name given to us by our parents, or a gendered way in which we move our
bodies. The distinction between the two types of markers is, of course, fragile. An accent can reflect the
traces of one's biography as well as be employed for impersonation purposes. This instability about the
extent to which a marker should be construed as an intended, manipulated message is at the center of
this Article, since it is the central challenge that markers pose to legal reasoning.
4. For the purposes of this research, my working definition of "appearance" is wider than this
word's dictionary meaning or common usage. It includes not only visible markers such as attire, hair,
jewelry, or makeup. In fact, I refer to personal markers such as names, manners of speech (accent,
vernacular, and pronunciation), and language. Why all these features, and why not others? Recalling the
proverbial warning not to judge a book by its cover, all these characteristics are considered by our
culture as "cover" rather than "book." In other words, they are viewed as being the external packaging
of the person rather than his or her internal "essence."
5. According to this approach, an afro hairstyle should be recognized because it is legally
considered a natural attribute of Black race, but comrows, which are viewed as artificial, should not be
legally recognized as an important aspect of Black identity.
6. Cohen's aspired name, Albert Connelly, was not considered completely white, but Irish, another
racially marked category in that era. See In re Cohen, 4 Conn. Supp. at 342. We do not know what
prompted the petitioner to seek an Irish name. It is possible that he felt that obtaining a name that was
then considered completely white would be too big a leap, which would risk his possibility to pass. Irish
were not considered white, but perhaps they were located a few degrees higher than Jewish people in
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examine in this Article complicate the concept of identity by maintaining that
external appearance is an important aspect of it. If a different name can make
you more American (as Cohen's petition implies), then national identity is
more socially constructed than the law would make it out to be.
I suggest shifting from thinking about appearance through the paradigm of
7 8identity to viewing it through the paradigm of personhood. Understanding
appearance as an aspect of personhood, rather than of identity, would release
the law from searching for appearances that constitute "a fit between inner
nature and outer station." 9 Shifting from the framework of identity to that of
personhood would not render identity completely irrelevant to the analysis.
Sometimes identity plays a significant role in one's sense of person. It is not
that personhood contains identity such that identity is a particular aspect of
personhood. Rather, because there is some overlap between the two concepts,
courts would also take into account the role that identity plays in the applicant's
personhood in considering the connection between appearance and personhood.
social status. Or, perhaps, the chosen name reflects a lack of full mastery of the nuances of racial
distinctions in this country. For analyses of the change in the racial categorization of Irish and Jews, see
KAREN BRODKIN, How JEWS BECAME WHITE FOLKS AND WHAT THAT SAYS ABOUT RACE IN AMERICA
(1998); and NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE (1995).
7. The term "identity" has become ubiquitous in contemporary socio-legal writing, and thus has
many meanings and usages. Here I use it in the political sense of group affiliation, mainly of minority,
marginalized, underrepresented, or oppressed groups. In the United States today, this includes groups
divided according to race, ethnicity, nationality, gender, sexual orientation, or (dis)ability. See, e.g.,
David A. Hollinger, Identity in the United States, in KEYWORDS: IDENTITY 25, 32 (Nadia Tazi ed., 2004)
(discussing this meaning of identity). The way in which I use identity should not be confused with its
usage in psychological discourse, in which "to have an identity is to have a unified self, capable of
acting effectively in the world"-a definition that will sometimes "involve close ties with this or that
group, but group affiliation is incidental rather than definitional to the process." Id. at 30-31.
8. I juxtapose "identity" and "personhood" in order to stress the way in which the latter term
pertains to the more universal aspects of human experience. Personhood refers to the general experience
of being human and having a sense of self (which is not, of course, a process detached from society, but
depends upon social recognition and interaction). As the Greek origin of the word suggests, personhood
is entangled in the experience of appearing, of having a concrete shape, body, and perceived presence.
Personhood also relates to individuality, to being socially recognized as somebody, or as a distinct
human entity. Jerrold Seigel describes these meanings well:
[T]he word [personhood] echoes with some of its ancient sources, the Greek prosopon
meaning the mask wom by characters in a play, taken into Latin as persona, literally
animating the mask "by sound," and referring by extension to the occupant of a particular
social position or status. Modem usage makes personhood or personality sometimes a dignity
conveyed by social recognition, and sometimes a quality deriving from individual talents or
gift ....
JERROLD SEIGEL, THE IDEA OF THE SELF: THOUGHT AND EXPERIENCE IN WESTERN EUROPE SINCE THE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 16 (2005); see also Paula M.L. Moya, What's Identity Got to Do With It?
Mobilizing Identities in the Multicultural Classroom, in IDENTITY POLITICS RECONSIDERED 96, 97-98
(Linda Martin Alcoff et al. eds., 2006) (contrasting "ascriptive identities," which are "historical and
collective, and generally operate through the logic of visibility," with "subjectivity," which "refers to
our individual sense of self, our interior existence, our lived experience of being a more-or-less coherent
self across time"). Moya's usage of subjectivity is similar to my usage of personhood. Accordingly, she
stresses that subjectivity has a social aspect: "The term also implies our various acts of self-
identification, and thus necessarily incorporates our understanding of ourselves in relation to others."
Moya, supra, at 98.
9. SIEGEL, supra note 8, at 353.
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While identity would not be completely irrelevant to the inquiry, it also
would not be, as it is now, the central question examined by courts in
determining whether one's appearance should be legally protected. Rather,
identity would be addressed through the notion of personhood. So, for example,
if one's sexual or racial identity is a significant part of one's personhood, and if
one's appearance is related to one's identity, then this appearance would be
protected. I suggest that one's appearance would also be protected if it has
nothing to do with one's sense of identity but only with one's sense of
personhood. Shifting the focus of appearance cases from identity to personhood
would open a way for the law to draw a "protective circle" around legal
subjects-a circle in which subjects would be relieved of the need to explain
why their identity justifies and legitimizes their appearance. Hair, dress, name,
and other such symbolic aspects of the person are by nature insubordinate to
language, particularly to the analytical language of concepts and propositional
statements. Our law and legal theory should recognize that appearance works
on a different level of meaning, although this mode of meaning-creation is
unfamiliar and counterintuitive to legal logic.
Courts cling to such an understanding of appearance in part because
appearance cases present a challenge to the law's understanding of identity as
an objective and natural category. By focusing on names, hairstyle, or clothing,
subjects bring to the fore the important role of appearance in shaping social
identity. As shown below, courts find it difficult to recognize the importance of
appearance in legal subjects' lives because such recognition could be implied
as acknowledging the significance of form over substance, a proposition that
might reverse the order of significance governing modern legal thinking.
Furthermore, contrary to the account emerging from the decisions examined in
this Article, identity categories such as race, sex, national origin, and sexual
orientation are not readily apparent to the naked eye.
Thus far, scholarly writing on appearance cases has analyzed them within a
specific doctrinal framework, such as Title VII's 10 ban on discrimination
against minorities," the freedom to wear religious garments, 12 freedom of
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e etseq. (2000).
11. See, e.g., ROBERT C. POST ET AL., PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW (2002) [hereinafter PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES]; Katharine T. Bartlett,
Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace
Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541 (1994); Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the
Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365 (1991); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati,
Conversations at Work, 79 OR. L. REV. 103 (2000); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working
Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000); Thomas Ling, Smith v. City of Salem: Title VII Protects
Contra-Gender Behavior, 40 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 277 (2005); Mari J. Matsuda, Voices ofAmerica:
Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329
(1991); Gowri Ramachandran, Intersectionality as "Catch 22": Why Identity Performance Demands
Are Neither Harmless nor Reasonable, 69 ALB. L. REV. 299 (2005); Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111
YALE L.J. 769, 875 (2002); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Race Discrimination: An
Argument About Assimilation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 365 (2006); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait
Discrimination as Sex Discrimination: An Argument Against Neutrality, 83 TEX. L. REV. 167 (2004).
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speech, 13 or name laws. 14 This Article cuts across traditional doctrinal
categories and takes an overarching meta-doctrinal perspective, arguing that
appearance cases consistently pose the same challenge to the legal logic across
different doctrinal and jurisdictional contexts in which they transpire. Namely,
appearance cases invoke complex questions pertaining to the relationship
between form and substance, or between signifier and signified. While the legal
reasoning mode pursues certainties and privileges stable foundations on which
to base its conclusions, personal markers such as hair, name, or dress style
create meaning in a suggestive, tentative, and unstable way, thus leaving courts
puzzled as to the appropriate significance that should be attributed to them.
This understanding, I argue, mandates developing new legal tools for treating
appearance.
B. Untying the Knot Between Appearance and Identity
Most commentators frame appearance cases in terms of the plight of
members of minority groups and analyze the cases from the perspective of
identity politics. Kenji Yoshino, a leading voice in the call to recognize
appearance as part of antidiscrimination law, is concerned about the way in
which appearance requirements reflect an expectation that members of minority
groups assimilate. 15 Employing a performative approach to identity, Yoshino
demonstrates how requirements that Blacks avoid "flaunting" their racial
identity or that gays act straight are not merely symbolic and do not remain on
the surface but work to reshape identity and erase "essential" differences.
16
12. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Permissible Scope of Legal Limitations on the Freedom
of Religion or Belief in the United States, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1187, 1266-68 (2005); T. Jeremy
Gunn, Religious Freedom and Lai'citg: A Comparison of the United States and France, 2004 BYU L.
REv. 419 (2004); Michael E. Lechliter, The Free Exercise of Religion and Public Schools: The
Implications of Hybrid Rights on the Religious Upbringing of Children, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2209, 2235-
40 (2005); Mark C. Rahdert, A Jurisprudence of Hope: Justice Blackmun and the Freedom of Religion,
22 HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 36-40 (1998); Stefanie Walterick, The Prohibition of Muslim Headscarvesfrom
French Public Schools and Controversies Surrounding the Hijab in the Western World, 20 TEMP. INT'L
& CoMP. L.J. 251 (2006).
13. See, e.g., Cindy Lavorato & John Saunders, Commentary, Public High School Students, T-
Shirts and Free Speech: Untangling the Knots, 209 ED. LAW REP. (WEST) 1 (July 13, 2006); Justin T.
Peterson, School Authority v. Students' First Amendment Rights: Is Subjectivity Strangling the Free
Mind at Its Source?, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 931 (2005); Jennifer L. Specht, Younger Students,
Different Rights? Examining the Standard for Student-Initiated Religious Free-Speech in Elementary
Schools, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1313 (2006).
14. See, e.g., Kif Augustine-Adams, The Beginning of Wisdom Is To Call Things by Their Right
Names, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 1 (1997); Aeyal M. Gross, Rights and Normalization: A
Critical Study of European Human Rights Case Law on the Choice and Change of Names, 9 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 269 (1996); Omi Morgenstern Leissner, The Name of the Maiden, 12 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J.
253 (1997); K.M. Sharma, What's in a Name?: Law, Religion, and Islamic Names, 26 DENY. J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 151 (1998); Esther Suarez, A Woman's Freedom to Choose Her Surname: Is It Really a Matter
of Choice?, 18 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 233 (1997).
15. Yoshino, supra note 1I, at 771-83.
16. Id. at 865-75.
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Such limitations on the freedom to perform minority identity are discriminatory
because they do not impose similar appearance requirements on members of
the hegemonic group.
Critics of Yoshino's approach argue that recognition of appearance as part
of the right to equality would have reductive effects on the notion of racial
identity. Richard Ford recognizes that, despite good intentions, arguments that
use multiculturalism and diversity as rationales for racial equality divert
attention from bigotry, political oppression, and economic inequality-where
racism lies-to the aesthetic and symbolic dimensions of race. He argues that
efforts to protect identity-related appearance exaggerate cultural differences
and deny communality between different racial and ethnic groups in order to
bolster the multicultural rationale. This entails "an essentially conservative
,,17project of cultural preservation and a fetishism of pedigree and tradition ....
Claims that appearance should be protected as part of race will, Ford fears,
constrict the freedom of all the members of the racial group, such that in order
to be recognized as Blacks, they will be forced to embody the essential Black
by retaining their paradigmatic, "authentic" Black appearance.18
I identify with Ford's unease regarding the conflation of identity and
appearance. I agree that identities come in many shapes and forms, and that
recognizing appearance claims as part of identity claims might produce a
simplistic account of both appearance and identity. I also support, however,
Yoshino's project of widening the scope of the legal conception of human
experience so that it will recognize the role of symbolic and performative
dimensions.
While both approaches have merits, both are also limited: Yoshino's
approach is ultimately unsuccessful in protecting minority identities from
assimilation because it relies on an unattainable model of the nexus between
appearance and identity. Ford's critique, on the other hand, does not leave room
for legal recognition of the representative aspects of identity.
I argue that the conflation between appearance and identity contributes to
the current analytical impasse. Therefore, I seek to cut the Gordian knot of
appearance and identity by adding to the analysis appearance cases that do not
involve members of minority or underrepresented groups. 19 Such a widening of
the analytical scope would reveal that appearance is a central arena of human
experience and should not be treated solely as a matter concerning minority
17. RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RACIAL CULTURE: A CRITIQUE 56 (2005).
18. Id. at 44.
19. As a feminist legal scholar, I recognize the importance of social movements and activism
organized around identity consciousness, and I am generally not opposed to the politics of identity. For a
helpful contemporary discussion of the power and contribution of the politics of identity, see Renato
Rosaldo, Identity Politics: An Ethnography by a Participant, in IDENTITY POLITICS RECONSIDERED,
supra note 8, at 118 (reviewing the American debate about identity politics and pointing to the benefits
of social mobilization through awareness of the participant's subject position); see also Hollinger, supra
note 7, at 34 (defining identity politics as "political mobilization by, and on behalf of, identity groups").
[Vol. 19:49
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identities. In other words, while most commentators approach these cases from
the perspective of identity as membership in a minority group, I propose
understanding appearance as a matter pertaining to personhood.
Understanding appearance as an aspect of personhood rather than of
minority identity would enable courts to concentrate on the role of appearance
itself in the lives of social actors, rather than on the role of appearance as a
proxy for identity. Turning to appearance as the analytical starting point reveals
not only that every identity-even that of members of the unremarkable
majority who blend in more easily-is constituted and maintained through its
external and symbolic aspects, but also that the relationship between
appearance and identity is complex, bidirectional, and unstable. Hairstyles,
manners of speech, and names are indeed related to identity, but this
relationship is not one of providing proof (one's hairstyle does not prove that
one is Black), but rather one of association or connotation (one's hairstyle
suggests that one may be Black). Hairstyle or dress can be suggestive,
insinuative, or evocative of one's identity, but not indicative or symptomatic of
it. A given hairstyle can only resonate or echo a particular identity; it cannot
denote it, as the legal logic would expect. This new theoretical framework to
understanding personal markers, then, would provide tools for better
responding to appearance claims of members of minority groups as well.
C. Appearance as the Poetics of Personhood
I propose integrating a new concept into appearance adjudication, which I
dub "the poetics of personhood." Under my suggested normative model, the
law would shift from treating names or clothes as propositional statements that
have an informative function of correctly marking the identity of their bearers,
to treating such appearances as poetic occurrences. The analogy to poetic
language is helpful here because it enables us to recognize that appearance is
never just appearance; it is never a matter of form and not content, an external
and insubstantial issue. The language of poetry functions not merely to deliver
information or develop an argument. Rather, it is a language that calls attention
to itself. In poetry, the medium is inseparable from the meaning. It is
impossible to rephrase a poem, or to sum up its content in a way that will fully
capture what it does, because part of a poem's effect is produced through
texture, rhythm, sound, and connotation. Similarly, asking a legal subject to
articulate his or her appearance in a clear and simple identity claim
misunderstands the way appearance operates in relation to personhood.
This methodology also departs from existing scholarship by analyzing
cases in a comparative context: Canada, the United States, and Israel. The
manners in which the issue is framed and addressed bear stark similarities
across these three liberal democracies. This Article will show that these diverse
2007]
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legal systems are similarly puzzled by the fundamental question of the
relationship between signifier and signified, or, in our context, the foundation
of appearance in legal subjects' lives. Despite the profound differences between
these legal systems-in their history and tradition, their institutional structure,
and the socio-cultural context within which they operate-they all have similar
constitutional commitments to equality and liberty, and demonstrate a similar
modernist preference for certainty of meaning. They are therefore similarly
challenged by the question of personal appearance.
I. THE PROBLEM: WHAT GOES WRONG IN APPEARANCE CASES
The prevailing mode of legal reasoning finds it necessary to render the
question of the plaintiff's appearance into a question of the plaintiffs identity.
Furthermore, while claiming to be merely describing or diagnosing that
identity, courts in fact produce it. The rulings analyzed in this Part assume that
every personal appearance is a clear message and that underneath every
personal appearance there is (and should be) a solid, clear, and stable identity
of the bearer. This typology of identity enables the courts to examine whether
the appearance in question is warranted and worthy of legal protection. Only if
the appearance correctly manifests its bearer's identity will the law support the
plaintiff's appearance claim. I argue that the judicial inclination to diagnose the
identity underlying the plaintiffs appearance is unconvincing and unsuccessful
at providing protection to members of the minority identity groups in question.
A. Overture: Law's Persistent Search for Identity Beneath the Appearance
The applicant in Hernandez-Montiel v. INS,20 a Mexican citizen, sought
asylum in the United States because in his home country he was repeatedly
harassed, raped, and attacked for wearing women's clothing. He was sexually
abused by police, physically beaten by youth in his neighborhood, expelled
from school, and required by his family to leave his home. United States law
grants asylum to, among others, applicants who demonstrate that they are
unable to avail themselves of the protection of their home countries "owing to a
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of... membership in a
particular social group ... ,,21 But an Immigration Judge and the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied Hernandez-Montiel's asylum application
because "the tenor of the respondent's claim is that he was mistreated because
of the way he dressed ... and not because he is a homosexual. 22
20. 225 F.3d 1084 (9thCir. 2000).
21. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42)(A) (2000).




Additionally, the BIA found it difficult to characterize the petitioner's
dress as inherently related to his identity because he could not remember how
he was dressed when he was arrested while attempting to cross the border into
the United States. This memory failure served as an inference that the
petitioner's style of dress was superficial, unessential, and "a volitional act, not
an -immutable trait."23 This inconsistency of appearance supported the BIA's
distrust of clothing's power to denote a stable identity.
The logic of the decision is based on the BIA's finding of an "actual"
identity "underneath" the petitioner's appearance: that of a "homosexual." The
BIA sought a nexus between the petitioner's diagnosed identity and his
appearance and concluded that since homosexuals do not necessarily wear
women's clothing, the petition should be denied: Appearance that is not
anchored in identity is not worthy of legal recognition.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision and granted asylum to
the petitioner. However, despite the reversed outcome, the court followed the
same logic as the BIA. In order to justify the petitioner's appearance, the court
produced an identity category to which the petitioner's dress style could be
securely attached-an identity that could account for his appearance. The court
explained that the petitioner was not merely gay, nor was he, as the lower
instance identified, part of the group of "homosexual males who dressed as
females." Rather, he belonged to the group of "gay men with female sexual
identities, ' 24 a group that, as expert witnesses confirmed, was persecuted in
Mexico. The court concluded that "[h]is female sexual identity is immutable
because it is inherent in his identity; in any event, he should not be required to
change it."
25
The dynamics of diagnosing the right identity category played a central
role in this case. The court explained that it would be appropriate to change the
definition of the petitioner's identity group from "homosexual males who dress
as females" to "gay men with female sexual identities" since the people in the
latter group are not "persecuted simply because they may dress as females or
because they engage in homosexual acts. Rather, [they] are singled out for
persecution because they are perceived to assume the stereotypical 'female,'
i.e., passive, role in gay relationships., 26 The change in classification of the
23. Id. at 5. The Immigration Judge opined:
If he wears typical female clothing sometimes, and typical male clothing other times, he
cannot characterize his assumed female persona as immutable or fundamental to his identity.
The record reflects that respondent's decision to dress as a women [sic] is volitional, not
immutable, and the fact that he sometimes dresses like a typical man reflects that respondent
himself may not view his dress as being so fundamental to his identity that he should not
have to change it.
In re Hemandez-Montiel, No. A72 994 275, at 8-9 (l.J. Dec. Feb. 19, 1997) (San Diego, CA) (Bagley,
1.J.) (on file with author).
24. Hemandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1094 (9th Cir. 2000).
25. Id. at 1087.
26. Id. at 1094.
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social group seems to go deeper into the reality of identity. It is not only
dressing habits that are at play in the petitioner's social persecution, but also his
gender identity. This typology craze dominates the case. At one point, the court
notes in a footnote that "[iun addition to being a gay man with a female sexual
identity, [Hernandez-Montiel's] brief states that he 'may be considered a
transsexual. ,,
2 7
Particularly interesting is the court's apparent reservation about relying on
dress as a meaningful locus of any legal reality. The petitioner's legal victory
was based on the law's establishment of who he was, rather than on the social
rejection in Mexico of what he wore: Appearance, according to this holding,
cannot be a locus of legal recognition and protection, but minority identity can.
For the court to delve into an allegedly more substantial level of identity is
neither convincing nor necessary under U.S. asylum law. In this case, the
petitioner's identity not only manifested itself through appearance but also
occurred in appearance. In other words, it is unclear which came first-the
petitioner's dressing in women's clothing or the "female sexual identity" with
which he was diagnosed. The court explained that "[g]ay men with female
sexual identities outwardly manifest their identities through characteristics
traditionally associated with women, such as feminine dress, long hair and
fingernails. ' 28 Thus, the theory suggested by the court is that first, one is of
female sexual identity, and only then is this identity represented through one's
clothes.
Like the meaning of a poem, I suggest, appearance is not a reflection of
identity, but a part of finding, making, and maintaining an identity. In the
words of literary scholar Cleanth Brooks,
[N]ot only our reading of the poem is a process of exploration, but...
[the] process of making the poem was probably a process of
exploration too. To say that [the poet] 'communicates' certain matters
to the reader tends to falsify the real situation .... [The poet] explores,
29
consolidates, and 'forms' the total experience that is the poem.
The deeper move into the petitioner's underlying identity is not necessary
under the statutory framework regarding asylum seekers. U.S. law provides
refugee recognition to people who are persecuted in their home country on
account of membership in a particular social group.30 The social group whose
members suffer persecution (by state or by private actors without the protection
of the state) need not be an established, stable group, with a fixed identity; it
can be a social fact established by social perceptions and social views, not by
27. Id. at 1095 n.7.
28. Id. at 1094.
29. CLEANTH BROOKS, THE WELL WROUGHT URN: STUDIES IN THE STRUCTURE OF POETRY 69
(1947).
30. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42)(A) (2000).
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underlying realities. 31 The 2001 UNHCR guidelines on persecuted social
groups clarify this point:
[A] particular social group is a group of persons who share a common
characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are
perceived as a group by society. The characteristic will often be one
which is innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to
identity, conscience or the exercise of one's human rights.
32
Perception as a distinct group which warrants hostilities is key, then, to winning
relief. The guidelines also say that the asylum seeker does not have to establish
that the trait for which he is persecuted be so immutable or fundamental to
human dignity that a person should not be compelled to forsake it:
If a claimant alleges a social group that is based on a characteristic
determined to be neither unalterable or [sic] fundamental, further
analysis should be undertaken to determine whether the group is
nonetheless perceived as a cognizable group in that society. So, for
example, if it were determined that owning a shop or participating in a
certain occupation in a particular society is neither unchangeable nor a
fundamental aspect of human identity, a shopkeeper or members of a
particular profession might nonetheless constitute a particular social
group if in the society they are recognized as a group which sets them
apart.
33
The court thus should not have sought to identify Hernandez-Montiel's
correct, clinically defined, gender or sexual identity, but rather whether his
dress habits rendered him a member of a disfavored group in the eyes of his
society and attracted hostile reactions.
In addition, the guidelines state that while persecution cannot be the sole
defining factor of the group, "persecutory actions towards a group may be a
relevant factor in determining the visibility of a group in a particular society."
34
In appearance cases, courts should consider identity only to the extent that
it is relevant, which is not what the subject's identity "really" is, but instead
what it is taken to be socially. In other words, what the asylum-seeker brought
to court was not his identity, but the intolerant social response he received in
31. U.S. asylum law recognizes as a persecuted social group, for example, women who object to
gender-based restrictions in their home countries, such as wearing a veil, and who would be subject to
persecution due to their noncompliance. See Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1241 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating
that this type of "particular social group may satisfy the BIA's definition of that concept" but denying
relief to petitioner); Safaie v. INS, 25 F3d 636, 640 (8th Cir. 1994) (same).
32. UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: "Membership of a particular social group"
within the context of Article IA(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees, 11, U.N. Doe. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002) [hereinafter Guidelines on
International Protection] (emphasis added). The interpretive approach of these guidelines was recently
affirmed in United States law. See In re C-A-, 23 1. & N. Dec. 951, 956-57 (B.I.A. 2006) (citing the
UNHCR guidelines and recognizing that they are in harmony with American law).
33. Guidelines on International Protection, supra note 32, 13.
34. Id. 14. The Guidelines also clarify that there is no requirement that the social group be
cohesive, i.e., that its members know each other or associate with each other as a group. See id. 15.
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Mexico. Thus, the project of producing an accurate account of the petitioner's
identity was irrelevant for the purpose of his asylum claim. Nor was it
appropriate here to question the relationship between appearance and identity.
In the context of the right to asylum, the court should not have been interested
in the identity that actually underlied the appearance, but rather in the identity
as it was socially manifested through appearance.
To the extent that a subject's sexual identity exists meaningfully, it exists
within its social function. The court should have examined, not the applicant's
true identity, but whether the intolerant social response towards his perceived
identity was so illegitimate that it would entitle him to asylum under U.S. law.
What matters for analyzing the social response is a subject's imputed sex and
sexuality, not his real sex and sexuality. As Anne Herrmann points out, gender
depends on the apparent naturalness of the sex underneath it. She explains:
"[Sex] attribution relies not only on what is visible but on what is assumed to
exist ... . The relationship between sex and gender... does not suggest that
sex evolves into gender, but rather that gender relies on sex for its meaning."
35
In its quest to determine the petitioner's true sexual identity, the court
effectively emulated the intolerant public responses in Mexico.
36
Both for the court and for the intolerant Mexican social actors that harassed
the applicant, there was no way to know about his "female sexual identity"
except by and through his dress. The ruling itself reflected this epistemology in
its description of the applicant's sexual identity: "[Hernandez-Montiel] has
known that he was gay from the age of eight and began dressing as a woman
when he was 12.
The petitioner's female sexual identity was inextricably connected to his
dress habits. And yet, the logic of the decision was founded on the premise that
the court could separate the existence of an identity from its external
manifestations.
To better respond to the way appearance creates social identities, courts
must shift their emphasis from what the legal subject is to how he or she
appears to be. Since appearance is the terrain in which prejudice occurs, the law
35. Herrmann continues:
Sex itself becomes a gendered category. A "natural" sex is not established prior to culture,
functioning as a neutral surface on which culture acts without consideration to sexual
politics . . . . What allows sex to appear as "natural" is the assurance that it will not be
mistaken for a performance. Even when gender is "performed" through cross-dressing, the
performance relies on the reestablishment of a single "true" sex.
Anne Herrmann, "Passing" Women, Performing Men, in THE FEMALE BODY: FIGURES, STYLES,
SPECULATIONS 181-82 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1991).
36. See Moya, supra note 8, at 98 ("Essentialists about identity suppose that the relationship
between the ascriptive and the subjective is one of absolute identity. They imagine, for example, that if a
person can be assigned to a racial or gender category on the basis of some invariable characteristic like
skin color or genitalia, then everything else of significance, including how he or she self-identifies, his
or her propensity for violence, personal characteristics, and even innate mental capacity follows from
being a member of that particular group.").
37. Hemandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1095 (9th Cir. 2000).
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should focus its analytical rigor on whether the intolerant social responses
towards people with a certain appearance are justifiable, and not on whether an
appearance is justifiable in terms of the identity it allegedly reflects.
38
Sociologist Zygmunt Bauman captures the type of response demonstrated
by the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hernandez-Montiel. The impulse to produce
new categories in reaction to vague classifications reflects the modem urge for
order and semiotic transparency:
By themselves, hermeneutic problems do not undermine the trust in
knowledge and attainability of behavioral certainty. If anything, they
reinforce both. The way in which they define the remedy as learning
another method of classification, another set of oppositions, the
meanings of another set of symptoms, only corroborates the faith in
essential orderliness of the world and particularly in the ordering
capacity of knowledge.
39
In order to be allowed entrance, both into the legal order and into the
country, the petitioner had to cease being what Bauman calls one who is in
principle undecidable. 40 Temporarily, the applicant was allowed to occupy the
place of the "as-yet-undecided, '4 1 but only until the law adjusted for this new
identity category-not homosexual, not man, not woman, but homosexual with
female sexual identity. Bauman explains:
The other of modem intellect is polysemy, cognitive dissonance,
polyvalent definitions, contingency; the overlapping meanings in the
world of [what the modem intellect assigns to] tidy classifications and
filing cabinets. Since the sovereignty of the modem intellect is the
power to define and to make the definitions stick--everything that
eludes unequivocal allocation is an anomaly and a challenge. The other
of this sovereignty is the violation of the law of the excluded middle.
In both cases, resistance to definition sets the limit to sovereignty, to
power, to the transparency of the world, to its control, to order.
Thus, the incident in which the applicant tried to cross the United States
border while dressed in women's clothing threatened America's integrity and
the sovereignty of its borders in more than the literal way. The mismatch
between sex and dress style also posed a challenge to the epistemological logic
38. That dress was the central terrain of the social prejudice is further illustrated by a statement of a
human rights organization quoted in the decision stating that "[t]he government has said it will not
protect transvestites unless they are dressed like men .... " Id. at 1096.
39. ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, MODERNITY AND AMBIVALENCE 58 (1991).
40. Bauman adds:
Some strangers are not, however, the as-yet-undecided; they are, in principle, undecidables.
They are the premonition of that 'third element' which should not be. These are the true
hybrids, the monsters-not just unclassified, but unclassiable. They do not question just
this one opposition here and now: they question oppositions as such, the very principle of the
opposition, the plausibility of dichotomy it suggests and feasibility of separation it demands.
They unmask the brittle artificiality of division. They destroy the world.
Id. at 58-59.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 9.
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of modem society and its laws, for this mismatch challenged the order of neatly
classifiable identities.
Evident in the legal treatment of this case was an impulse to draw yet
another clear dividing line: a line between appearance, which is framed as
contingent and unreliable, and identity, which is more solid and foundational.
But identity is apprehended through appearance, and therefore such a clear
division misrepresents reality. Moreover, by insisting on framing the
petitioner's persecution with reference to his identity rather than with reference
to the social response towards his perceived identity, the court reaffirmed the
contention that the plaintiff was indeed different "at the core." In addition, the
judicial opinion presumed that any given dress style has one, clear-cut
meaning, and furthermore that this meaning is fully chosen and controllable.
The next Section's analysis demonstrates why it is futile for the legal inquiry to
focus on the correctness of the legal subject's self-labeling.
B. Appearance Cases Are About Appearance, Not Identity
The judicial disposition to evaluate appearance according to the extent to
which it is connected to an underlying identity leads to incoherent caselaw. As
we see below, similar appearance claims are adjudicated in opposite ways
depending on how courts assess the function of appearance in reliably signaling
the plaintiff's identity. I demonstrate this point by reviewing two cases that
presented similar facts, but that nonetheless yielded opposite legal conclusions.
In both cases, the plaintiffs argued that they were discriminated against on the
basis of sex because their gendered appearance did not conform to their
biological sex. The difference between the cases was that in one, the plaintiff
was able in the court's eyes to link his appearance claim to his identity,
convincing the court that there was no disharmony between his appearance and
his (real) identity. In the other, the plaintiff was unable to establish that her
appearance was warranted by her identity, and the court therefore declined to
protect her appearance.
The plaintiff in Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust43 entered a bank to apply
for a loan. "A biological male, he was dressed in traditionally feminine
attire." 44 After examining his photo identification cards, the bank employee
told Rosa that she would not provide him with a loan application until
he "went home and changed." She said that he had to be dressed like
one of the identification cards in which he appeared in a more
43. Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust, 214 F.3d 213 (lst Cir. 2000). See also Brief for NOW Legal
Defense and Education Fund and Equal Rights Advocates as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-
Appellant and in Support of Reversal, Rosa, 214 F.3d 213 (No. 99-2309), reprinted in 7 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 163 (2001).
44. Rosa, 214 F.3d at 213.
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traditionally male attire before she would provide him with a loan
application .... 45
Rosa sued the bank for sex discrimination under the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (ECOA),46 which prohibits discrimination against credit
applicants "on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital
status, or age .... The district court granted the bank's motion to dismiss the
plaintiffs sex discrimination claim, reasoning,
[T]he issue in this case is not [Rosa's] sex, but rather how he chose to
dress when applying for a loan. Because the Act does not prohibit
discrimination based on the manner in which someone dresses, Park
West's requirement that Rosa change his clothes does not give rise to
claims of illegal discrimination. Further, even if Park West's statement
or action were based upon Rosa's sexual orientation or perceived
sexual orientation, the Act does not prohibit such discrimination. 
48
On appeal, the bank argued that the dismissal below should be affirmed
because the ECOA does not apply to cross-dressers, citing cases referring to
homosexuals and transsexuals.49 The First Circuit reversed the dismissal and
remanded the case back to the lower court to determine as a question of fact
just what exactly the bank clerk assumed the plaintiff to be: a man, or a
homosexual. 50 The First Circuit explained that "[w]hile the district court was
correct in saying that the prohibited bases of discrimination under the ECOA do
not include style of dress or sexual orientation, that is not the discrimination
alleged. It is alleged that the Bank's actions were taken... 'on the basis of...
[the appellant's] sex."' 51 Since the antidiscrimination statute banned only
discrimination based on sex and not discrimination based on sexual orientation,
the plaintiff would have a successful sex discrimination claim if it were
factually established that the bank clerk sent him home "because she thought
that Rosa's attire did not accord with his male gender: in other words, that Rosa
did not receive the loan because he was a man, whereas a similarly situated
woman would have received the loan application."52 But the evidence would
also have to indicate that the clerk did not presume the plaintiff to be gay, for if
this were the case, her behavior would amount to discrimination based on
sexual orientation, which is not prohibited by the ECOA. The plaintiff would
win the case, then, if he were taken to be a man but not a gay man.53 "It is too
45. Id.
46. Rosa, 214 F.3d at 213 (bringing suit under 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2000)).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (2000).
48. Rosa, 214 F.3d at 213 (quoting the opinion below).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 215 (bracketed addition and second omission in original).
52. Id.
53. There is a more optimistic way of reading the case, but it is unclear whether future caselaw will
employ this reading. Such an interpretation of the case would focus on the decision's unprecedented
recognition of a transsexual's claim for sex stereotyping. If a man wearing women's clothing can win a
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early to say what the facts will show; it is apparent, however, that, under some
set of facts within the bounds of the allegations and non-conclusory facts in the
complaint, Rosa may be able to prove a claim under the ECOA.,
5 4
The game of identity categorization is at the center of the case. It may be
that the clerk thought that her client was a man dressed in a manner that was
inconsistent with his sex, said the court, but it may also be the case that the
clerk "refused to give Rosa the loan application because she thought he was
gay, confusing sexual orientation with cross-dressing." 55 The court adopts a
reproachful tone regarding the clerk's failure to accurately and correctly
diagnose the identity of her client, as if the distinction between these identities
were clear, stable, and decipherable at a glance.
If the clerk took the plaintiff to be gay, the court reasoned, then she must
have been unaware of any distinction between homosexuals and cross-dressers.
This implied that the court itself knew what the plaintiff's identity was: He was
a cross-dresser. It also implies that if he were a cross-dresser, then the court felt
he had a sex discrimination claim (as a man who can claim that a similarly
situated woman would have been treated differently). There are two fascinating
elements of this account. First, for the court, a man in a dress was a cross-
dresser. In an unbearable lightness of deciphering identity, the plaintiffs
behavior (which for all the court or we might know could have been a one-time
event) was instantly collapsed, or translated, into a clear and stable identity
category. The court left no space for uncertainty, interpretation, or formation
between the appearance and the identity. It is against this judicial habit (or
urge) to typologize that I write this Article. Rosa did not claim to be a cross-
dresser; the court thus should not have assumed unquestioningly that merely
because he entered the bank in a dress, he was and could only be a cross-
dresser. In fact, as I argue throughout this Article, the question of the apt
classification of the plaintiff's identity was not the right one in determining
whether he suffered unlawful discrimination.
The court itself recognized that the statute prohibiting sex-based
discrimination protects cross-dressers: By saying that the plaintiff would win if
the bank clerk perceived him as a man and that the plaintiff was a cross-dresser,
the court suggested that cross-dressers are covered by the prohibition on sex-
based discrimination. This means that gender has "snuck in" to the sex-based
sex discrimination claim, this might mean that the court interpreted the law as forbidding discrimination
generated by a perceived gap between one's sex and one's gender. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228 (1989) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion), the Supreme Court declared that evaluating a female
employee negatively because she did not dress, talk, and behave femininely amounted to sex-based
discrimination. Rosa is the first case in which this claim was argued successfully by an apparent
transsexual. In this respect, Rosa is indeed a remarkable achievement that should not be understated.
However, it remains to be seen if the case will develop in this way. See also Simonton v. Runyon, 232
F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000), discussed infra note 91.




discrimination doctrine; if cross-dressers can be protected when the statute
prohibits sex-based discrimination, then it is arguable that transgendered people
could be protected as well. After all, wouldn't a cross-dresser and a
transgendered person who has not started any hormonal or surgical treatments
and only wears feminine attire look the same to the bank clerk (as to anyone
else in interacting with them)? 56 Ultimately, regardless of the "correct"
classification of the plaintiff's identity,57 he was discriminated against because
of his sex, since he did not wear clothes that conformed to his sex.
It is not fully clear, then, which of the two questions the Rosa court saw as
determinative: the question of the clerk's perception of the plaintiffs identity,
or the question of the plaintiffs identity as defined by the court. The tables
below represent an attempt to fully understand the reasoning in Rosa according
to the two options: Table A assesses the outcomes if the main question is one of
the identity of the plaintiff as perceived by the clerk, and Table B assesses the
outcomes if the main question is the identity of the plaintiff as defined by the
court.
If the main question is one of perceived identity, then as long as the clerk
perceived the plaintiff as a heterosexual man (be it a man, a cross-dresser, or a
pre-operative transsexual), he would win a sex-based discrimination claim.
However, if he were perceived as gay or as a post-operative transsexual (that is,
as a woman or as someone who had the social identity of a woman and was
thus expected to wear women's clothes), then the plaintiff would not have a
sex-based discrimination claim-because he could not claim that a similarly
situated "social" male (for example, a female-to-male transsexual) who wore a
dress would have been treated better.
Table A
Plaintiff, while wearing feminine Does plaintiff have a sex-based
clothes, perceived by defendant as: discrimination claim?
A man Yes




56. I am absolutely in favor of broadening the bases for unlawful discrimination so that they
include gender identity and sexual orientation. My critique should not be interpreted to suggest that I do
not support such broadening of the antidiscrimination standards. However, I insist on developing this
critique because, although in the short run this broadening might seem progressive, in the long run it
reinforces a skewed understanding of identity and of the dynamics of discrimination.
57. There is little point in classifying a subject's gender identity when this classification is general
and devoid of any particular context. For example, the plaintiff may be classified as transgendered for
the purpose of requiring his health insurance to participate in his gender reassignment procedures. But
the notion that there is validity or stability to the court's seemingly factual observation that he is "this"
or "that" is troubling.
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The other possibility that emanates from the language of the opinion also
suggests incoherent outcomes. By saying that the plaintiff "was" a cross
dresser, the court might be suggesting that the determinative question in the
case was what the plaintiff's underlying identity was. If this is so, then the legal
situation is as follows:
Table B
Plaintiff classified by the court as: Does plaintiff have a sex-based
discrimination claim?
A man Yes




There is not only incoherence between the two scenarios, but also internal
incoherence in each. For example, there seems to be no justification under the
prohibition on sex-based discrimination explaining why cross-dressers and
some transsexuals are covered while other transsexuals are not.
By focusing on what the clerk assumed the plaintiff to be, the court, as in
the asylum case discussed earlier, 58 transformed the case into one that depended
on a fit between dress and identity. If the clerk took Rosa to be a man, then he
was a cross-dresser, and cross-dressers should not be asked to wear clothes that
reflect their biological sex, but clothes that reflect the opposite sex (this is, after
all, what cross-dressers wear). But if the clerk thought Rosa was gay, then
asking him to change from a dress into male clothing presents a legitimate
request, since most homosexual men do not wear dresses.
The point of this analysis is not that Title VII and similar
antidiscrimination rules should be expanded to include a ban on discrimination
of homosexuals (although this would undoubtedly be a positive development).
Nor am I merely arguing that Rosa has a sex-based discrimination claim
because his gender did not match his sex. Rather, I posit that the court's interest
in the plaintiff's identity (either as perceived by the bank clerk or as classified
by the court itself) reinforces a flawed conception of the relationship between
appearance and identity. We cannot assume that Rosa's identity (transsexual,
cross-dresser, gay, or, for that matter, just a man who ran out of clean pants and
borrowed his wife's dress to run an errand) preceded his attire. The dress that
he wore to the bank cannot be taken as merely a reflection of his underlying
identity. Just as appearance and identity can never fully overlap (for, as in
language, there is always a representation gap between "internal" identity and
58. Hemandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000); supra Part I.A.
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"external" manifestation), so appearance and identity cannot be completely
disconnected. Rather, in the context of discrimination, it is the space between
identity and appearance that is interesting.
Indeed, discrimination is a matter of perception. The discriminating party
perceives the other as having certain stigmatized traits. But the question that the
court should have asked is not, "What identity did the clerk perceive Rosa to
have?" but rather, "How did she perceive the connection between Rosa's
identity and his appearance?" This is where social meaning is created; this is
where social interaction occurs. Social responses towards a social actor never
respond to identity alone or to appearance alone. They respond to the meaning
created by the synthesis, or the dynamic, between one's appearance and one's
presumed identity (just as in language, it is neither the signifier nor the
signified alone that makes meaning, but their interrelation). In sum, Rosa's sex
was ambiguous to the bank clerk. It was this perceived ambiguity, rather than
the identity that she perceived him to be, that prompted the discrimination. The
problem with the clerk's behavior was not her poor literacy of the typology of
sexual identities but her intolerant response to a sexually ambiguous
appearance.
In a recent case that raised similar facts and legal questions, the Sixth
Circuit criticized logic such as the Rosa court's:
[S]ome courts have held that this latter form of discrimination is of a
different and somehow more permissible kind. For instance, the man
who acts in ways typically associated with women is not described as
engaging in the same activity as a woman who acts in ways typically
associated with women, but is instead described as engaging in the
different activity of being a transsexual (or in some instances, a
homosexual or transvestite). Discrimination against the transsexual is
then found not to be discrimination "because of... sex," but rather,
discrimination against the plaintiffs unprotected status or mode of self
identification. In other words, these courts superimpose classifications
such as "transsexual" on a plaintiff, and then legitimize discrimination
based on the plaintiff's gender non-conformity by formalizing the non-
conformity into an ostensibly unprotected classification.
59
The decision in Rosa, then, should have concentrated on the biased
behavior of the bank clerk, based on the perceived nonconformity between the
plaintiffs sex and gender. For the purpose of reviewing the plaintiff's sex
discrimination claim, the law should be indifferent to the question of what he
was. Why should the seemingly ontological fact that he was a transsexual, or a
cross-dresser, matter? Whatever his clinically typologized sexual identity,
59. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 574 (6th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). The judgment's
strongly critical language added that the district court accounted for the plaintiff's contra-gender
behavior "only insofar as it confirmed for the court Smith's status as a transsexual." Id. This case is
discussed more elaborately infra Section IlI.A.
2007]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
shouldn't the law focus on the clerk's response and question its legitimacy?
60
Rather than framing the case around the plaintiffs identity underneath his
appearance, I suggest that this case, as most appearance cases, revolved around
our desire to decipher identities instantly. More accurately, it was about
whether the law should support the expectation that social actors should be
readily labeled, that is, easy to figure out at a glance.
Things get more complicated if one considers the information about Rosa
available in documents published after the ruling. The case was litigated based
on the plaintiffs identity as a male, and the decision referred to him using male
pronouns. After the case was decided at the appellate level, the plaintiff's
counsel referred to Rosa in academic publications related to the case using
female pronouns, thus suggesting that Rosa was undergoing a sex change and
interested in being perceived as a woman.6 1 This variant may change the
doctrinal logic of the decision yet again, for if the plaintiff is legally
categorized as a woman, this pulls the rug out from under her sex
discrimination claim. In other words, if the plaintiff is a woman, she can no
longer argue sex-based discrimination, because she cannot argue that a
similarly situated person of the opposite sex would have been treated any
better.
In the 2004 case of Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co.,62 the plaintiff
had an appearance claim similar to Rosa's. Unlike Rosa's claim, Jespersen's
was denied. The theoretical framework developed in this Article helps explain
this contradictory result.
The plaintiff, Ms. Jespersen, worked as a casino bartender. After 21 years
in her job, in which she received outstanding reviews for her performance, her
employer introduced new grooming standards, stating that for female
employees "[m]akeup... must be worn and applied neatly in complimentary
colors. Lip color must be worn at all times., 63 Jespersen's earlier attempts to
wear makeup made her feel emotionally distressed, "sick, degraded, exposed,
and violated." 64 Still, when makeup became mandatory in her workplace, she
tried wearing it in order to conform to the new regulations, but again felt
extremely unconformable and ill. 65 After refusing to wear makeup, she was
fired. The district court granted summary judgment for the casino, rejecting
Jespersen's Title VII claim. The court explained that since the plaintiff could
60. Cf Franklin H. Romeo, Beyond a Medical Model: Advocating for a New Conception of Gender
Identity and the Law, 36 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REV. 713 (2005) (critiquing the reliance of courts on
clinical diagnosis of sexuality).
61. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, Rosa, 214 F.3d 213 (No. 99-2309), reprinted in 7 MICH. J. GENDER
& L. 147 (2001); cf Katherine M. Franke, Brief for NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund and Equal
Rights Advocates as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant, Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust, 214
F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000) (No. 99-2309), reprinted in 7 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 164 (2001).
62. 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004), affd, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
63. Id. at 1078 n.2.
64. Id. at 1076.
65. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1194 (D. Nev. 2002).
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not demonstrate that the grooming requirements burdened women more than
66they burdened men, the sex discrimination claim was unwarranted. Indeed,
the casino's grooming policy created a thorough regime of separation between
the appearance of men and women:
The policy at issue required women to wear makeup, but prohibited
men from doing the same .... It allowed women to wear their hair up
or down without a restriction on length, but prohibited men from
having their hair reach below the top of their shirt collars .... Men
could not wear nail polish; women could wear nail polish, but only in
certain colors.... Finally, each had to wear solid black leather shoes.
6 7
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit similarly rejected Jespersen's claim.
68
Describing Jespersen's early experience wearing makeup in even grimmer
colors than the lower court, Judge Tashima, writing for the majority, noted that
"Jespersen found that wearing makeup made her feel sick, degraded, exposed,
and violated. Jespersen felt that wearing makeup 'forced her to be feminine'
and to become 'dolled up' like a sexual object. ,69 While the lower court
examined only the tangible burdens that the duty to wear makeup presented to
women (time and money), the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the performative
aspect of makeup-that is, its effect on the plaintiffs sense of self and ability
to fulfill her duties as a bartender. In other words, the court recognized that
"wearing makeup actually interfered with Jespersen's ability to be an effective
bartender (which sometimes required her to deal with unruly, intoxicated
guests) because it took away [her] credibility as an individual and as a
person.,
70
Jespersen told a story about the work of appearances "from the outside in"
in shaping her sense of self, including her sense of expected and possible
conduct. The makeup made her feel too feminine and limited her ability to
signal assertiveness and authority with patrons of the casino. Femininity was
associated in her mind with submissiveness and service, rather than with setting
boundaries and enforcing the rules, as her job required.
A claim concerning the possible effects of appearance on one's sense of
self is foreign to the logic that courts manifest in appearance cases-a logic that
treats appearance only as a reflection of a preexisting underlying identity. As
Jespersen demonstrates, the existing doctrine regarding appearance provides no
tools for courts to understand a claim such as Jespersen's. According to the
judicial logic that seeks a fit between appearance and identity, the makeup
66. See id. at 1195; see also Megan Kelly, Making-Up Conditions of Employment. The Unequal
Burden Test as a Flawed Mode ofAnalysis in Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 36 GOLDEN GATE U.
L. REV. 45 (2006) (arguing that the unequal burden test provides employees insufficient protection from
discrimination).
67. Jespersen, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1192-93 (citations omitted).
68. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1077.
69. Id.
70. Id. (citations omitted).
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requirement in Jespersen is not problematic at all. Women wear makeup, and,
since Jespersen is a woman, it is perfectly acceptable that the employer requires
that she reflect her underlying sex through appearance. 71 Had the plaintiff been
a man, the employer could not have forced him to wear makeup. 72 But makeup
for a woman is the way of the world; it keeps navigation in the convoluted
social jungle of sexual identities relatively safe. If women did not wear
makeup, we would find ourselves in a dreadfully vague social environment, an
endless game of fluid identities. 73 The courts are happy to help prevent this
from happening.
The facts leading to Rosa and Jespersen form an identical legal claim. In
both cases, plaintiffs encountered negative treatment because their appearances
were perceived as failing to comply with their underlying identity: Rosa was
perceived as being too feminine for his male sex, and Jespersen was perceived
as too masculine for her female sex.
And yet, although the facts are similar and both plaintiffs relied on a sex
discrimination claim, the outcomes differed. The plaintiff in Rosa won (or
could win, depending on the facts established in the lower court after remand),
while the plaintiff in Jespersen lost. This is because the legal logic seeks
harmony between appearance and identity, so that the former reliably reflects
the latter. This logic explains why Rosa was successful and Jespersen was not.
In Rosa, the court thought that sending a cross-dresser home due to his
feminine attire is an illegitimate behavior, for there is no reason to reprimand a
man for an appearance that fits his identity.
74
71. As the dissent in the en bane decision notes:
Makeup... touches delicate parts of the anatomy-the lips, the eyes, the cheeks-and can
cause serious discomfort.... If you are used to wearing makeup-as most American women
are-this may seem like no big deal. But those of us not used to wearing makeup would find
a requirement that we do so highly intrusive
Everyone accepts this as a reasonable reaction from a man, but why should it be different for
a woman?. .. I see no justification for forcing [women] to conform to Harrah's quaint notion
of what a 'real woman' looks like.
Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1117-18 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
72. See Devon Carbado et al., Makeup and Women at Work, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 4-12, on file with author) (reviewing the history of women's makeup
conventions and its relationship to female subordination).
73. Courts occasionally express their aversion to a world in which identities are blurred. See, e.g.,
Devine v. Lonschein, 621 F. Supp. 894, 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("At least until that dreadful day when
unisex identity of dress and appearance arrives, judicial officers... are entitled to some latitude in
differentiating between male and female attorneys, within the context of decorous professional behavior
and appearance.").
74. The case ofAlam v. Reno Hilton Corp., 819 F. Supp. 905 (D. Nev. 1993), also demonstrates the
problem of deciding an appearance claim according to the plaintiffs' identity. In this case, a group of
casino employees sued their employer for race and sex based discrimination under Title VII, claiming
that they were denied the better roles and shifts "due to a surreptitious policy of employing only young
'barbie doll' type women (i.e. sexually attractive) and that such a policy discriminated against men and
persons of minority backgrounds." Id. at 908. The plaintiffs' claim was denied because they could not
establish that all employees with the same sex or race were treated similarly (some non-whites and male
employees received the desired work conditions). See id. at 913-14 ("Staffing decisions based on such
subjective qualities demonstrated a rather atavistic approach on the part of the employer; however, when
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The plaintiff in Jespersen could not establish the necessary fit between her
identity and the appearance available to her since she could not argue that her
desired, unmade-up face fits with her female identity. Furthermore, the court
could not see what was wrong with an employer's grooming requirement that
enhances the "intelligibility" of sex and makes sure that men and women look
like their sex dictates. The plaintiff in Jespersen might thus have been better
off had she claimed that she was a cross-dresser rather than merely a woman
refusing to wear makeup and adhere to her sex. Just as the plaintiff in Rosa
might win his claim by establishing that he was discriminated against as a
cross-dresser (because similarly-situated women would have been treated
differently), so might the plaintiff in Jespersen have argued that as a cross-
dresser she wanted to maintain a masculine appearance and that for her
employer to require her to wear makeup amounted to sex discrimination. Like
the plaintiff in Rosa, had Jespersen had an underlying identity that justified not
wearing makeup, she would have provided the court with a valid reason, under
current law, to accept her claim, and would thus have appeased the court's
concern that her appearance did not accurately reflect her identity.
The opinions in both Rosa and Jespersen make use of progressive
approaches to gender identity, only to promote a conservative agenda. In
Jespersen, the district court accepted the employer's argument that current
social norms are more liberal and less strict with regard to the differences in
appearances between the sexes: "As Plaintiff states, 'in modem society, both
men and women wear makeup' .... Thus, prohibiting men from wearing
makeup may be just as objectionable to some men as forcing women to wear
makeup is to Plaintiff.,
75
Indeed, nowadays men can look feminine, and women can walk around
looking masculine. Harrah's Casino, however, will not tolerate such
transgressions, and it will realign unfitting social actors to ensure that men look
like men, and women look like women. Similarly, in Rosa,76 the court
conveyed the importance of being literate in the complex world of gender
identities. The bank clerk should have been able to differentiate a gay man from
a cross-dresser or a transsexual. The bank in Rosa should not be expected to be
tolerant of men who wear women's clothing with no apparent reason. This
such criteria are applied to different classes of people, the practice is not actionable. No Court can be
expected to create a standard on such vagaries as attractiveness or sexual appeal."). I realize that under
Title VII doctrine, plaintiffs must establish that they belong to a protected class. My contention is that
the attractive type of appearance that was preferred by the employer is indeed related to sex and to race,
but not in the direct way that the court unsuccessfully searches for. The fact that one of the employees
was Iranian, for example, could plausibly mean that he had too dark or foreign a look to be considered
attractive for the employer. Thus, it was not the national origin in itself that prompted prejudice against
him, but the embodied and concrete manifestation of that national origin.
75. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1193. The court further recognized that while "some women may
consider the requirement to wear makeup burdensome. . . . some men may feel the same way with
regard to the male makeup policy." Id.
76. Rosa, 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000); see also discussion supra Part I.B.
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deviation from the norm will be limited to men with a note from the
psychiatrist that provides them with the right underlying identity.
With such rulings, courts essentially constitute and protect a dull, if not
oppressive, account of the relationship between appearance and identity.
According to the vision of the social world emerging from, and promoted by,
appearance cases, no sympathy should be granted for vagueness or uncertainty
about social actors' identities.
Interlude I. The Problematic Account of Identity Emerging from Appearance
Cases
I have suggested that appearance adjudication should shift its emphasis
from tying a given name, hairstyle or dress style to the plaintiffs identity to
asking about the role of that appearance in relation to the plaintiffs
personhood. This Interlude explores the problematic account of identity that
emerges from appearance caselaw. The reasons that personhood is a more
appropriate concept in the context of appearance cases will be discussed in Part
II below.
In the past four decades since the civil rights movement's first significant
achievements, identity has become an ever more prevalent term of art for
lawmakers and legal theorists. As feminists and anti-racist advocates have
insisted (and in their footsteps proponents of gay rights and disability rights),
much is overlooked when questions are examined from a supposed "view from
nowhere." Accounting for the concrete experiences of people and groups
whose perspectives are markedly different from the hegemonic perspective is
essential since different social positions, material conditions, and access to
political power produce different types of knowledge, concerns, and modes of
action. The success of these claims has meant that categories such as sex, race,
ethnicity, nationality, age, and disability naturally roll off the tongues of
policymakers, lawyers, and judges, and inform their analyses more than ever
before.
There is no denying that introducing a vocabulary of identity into the law
has significantly increased the political voice of underrepresented groups,
narrowed economic gaps, and generally expanded access to cultural and
material resources. The lurking question, however, is what new blind spots the
identity-based analytical framework might produce. How might this new prism,
which has been valuable in enabling us to understand social stratifications and
to notice covert hierarchies, divert our attention from other complexities or
skew our perception of social dynamics?
My project can therefore be understood in the context of an ongoing
conversation in legal theory-a conversation that explores ways to invoke
identity as a basis for political empowerment and legal protection without
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erasing its complexity, fluidity, and tentative nature and without regressing into
reductive essentialism.
Appearance cases raise questions about the ways in which courts use
identity as an instrument organizing the social (and legal) world and as a means
of ascribing characteristics and intentions to legal subjects. The picture of
identity that emerges from the identity-centered appearance cases is troubling.
The legal account of identity and the way in which it operates in relation to
appearance renders this question extremely pressing. Appearance cases
generate a worrying sense that not much space is left in the courtroom for the
voices of actual, concrete people, because it is all taken up by "identities."
One's appearance claim is assessed not according to one's own report of the
role or importance of the appearance in one's life, but according to a legal
assessment of what one's assumed identity has to do with the disputed
appearance. 77 The actual individuals who stand before the bench convey a set
of affiliations, circumstances, and sensibilities that never add up to an ideal-
type identity category. Those individuals are subjected by the law to reductive
notions of what their supposed identity should look like.
The stipulation that identity and appearance should reinforce one another
reductively confines the repertoire and horizon of identity. In other words,
when the law requires that appearance be explained in terms of identity, the
specific (as opposed to ideal-type) personal stories of litigants' complex sets of
affiliations, aspirations, and subject positions are left unrecognized. 79 The law
construes the identity of the persons in front of it as if it were a transparent
essence with an already organized narrative, as opposed to a rich, nuanced, and
ever-evolving poetic text.
77. We should consider how the assumption that identity and appearance would be mutually
reinforcing confines the repertoire and horizon of identity. When the law requires that one's appearance
be explained in terms of one's identity, it can no longer recognize the concrete (and therefore far from
ideal-type) personal stories of its subjects' complex sets of affiliations, aspirations, and statures. We
might say that the "text of the person" is reduced from a rich and nuanced poem of sorts, to a one-
dimensional, ready-made narrative.
78. Zygmunt Bauman suggests that our current condition, in which each of us has multiple and only
partial affiliations, is essential to understanding contemporary selfhood:
[Tihe mode of "being a stranger" is experienced, to a varying degree, by all and every
member of contemporary society with its extreme division of labour and separation of
functionally separated spheres.... [T]he individual is a "displaced person" by definition: it is
the very fact that he cannot be fully subsumed under any of the numerous functional
subsystems which only in their combination constitute the fullness of his life process (the
fact, in other words, that he does not belong fully to any of the subsystems and no subsystem
can claim his sole allegiance) that makes him an individual.... One is tempted to say that he
is "fully at home" only with himself.... The self is burdened with the impossible task of
rebuilding the lost integrity of the world; or, more modestly, with the task of sustaining the
production of self-identity; doing on its own what was once entrusted to the native
community. In fact, it is now inside the self that such a "native community," as the frame of
reference for self-identity, must be construed.
BAUMAN, supra note 39, at 94-96.
79. See generally SEYLA BENHABIB, SITUATING THE SELF: GENDER, COMMUNITY AND
POSTMODERNISM IN CONTEMPORARY ETHICS (1992) (developing a conception of selfhood that
interrelates social position, cultural context, and material conditions).
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Considerable scholarship in the humanities and social sciences has
repeatedly provided cautionary notes about employing identity-based analysis.
We know by now that the repertoire of active and meaningful identity
categories varies from society to society and from era to era. The same people
are categorized under different identities in different cultural contexts.
Accordingly, we have learned that one's identity is constituted within the
culturally available classifications and that it is contingent upon how one is
socially situated. Finally, we know that identities are dynamic and that they are
maintained by repeated social interactions.
80
As the cases examined in this Article demonstrate, the use of identity as an
analytical framework is not without consequence: It has real ramifications on
the lives of law's subjects. I am interested in the conditions in which it would
be possible to keep identity as a useful and viable jurisprudential term, while
refraining from flattening and simplifying our understanding of the term
beyond recognition. Such successful usage of identity would require the law to
develop strategies to accommodate the complex ways in which identity
becomes a meaningful social category. Representation and appearance are
central to this process. I suggest that drawing on the model of poetic language
would be helpful in developing a more compelling way of using identity in
lawmaking.
If the law were to recover the possibility of using identity, it would need to
recognize that the main locus of identity is not some objective criteria devoid of
social context, but, rather, that identities are formed through ongoing social
interactions which create and shape their meaning. 81 Such social interactions do
not occur between bodiless, abstract, and general concepts ("Hello, I am
Blackness, nice to meet you. You must be Whiteness."). Contrary to the claim
implied in current jurisprudence, the law can ascribe identity to an individual,
not by transcendental view from the height of the bench, but through the same
straightforward means that any social actor has no choice but to use. That is,
through concrete encounters between specific individuals. One becomes
identified (i.e., seen as having a particular identity) only through social
80. The scholarship exploring the interplay between culture and identity is large in quantity and
diverse in disciplinary domains and methodology. For two essays that review and critique the
development of identity as an analytical category in the last half-century and that were particularly
illuminating for my project, see Linda Martin Alcoff, Who's Afraid of Identity Politics?, in RECLAIMING
IDENTITY: REALIST THEORY AND THE PREDICAMENT OF POSTMODERNISM 312 (Paula M.L. Moya &
Michael R. Hames-Garcia eds., 2000) and Roger Brubaker & Frederick Cooper, Beyond "Identity, " 29
THEORY & SOC'Y 1 (2000).
81. See JAMES A. HOLSTEIN & JABER F. GUBRIUM, THE SELF WE LIVE BY: NARRATIVE IDENTITY
IN A POSTMODERN WORLD 21-24 (2000) (discussing William James's conception of self). Holstein and
Gubruim describe James's caution that "to have words for things, such as the I and the me of the self,
risks reifying them rather than sustaining their referential status as simultaneous facets of the selves we
are .... Self is part and parcel of the process of referring to ourselves, to others, and to the world,




interactions that occur among concrete bodies, with particular appearances and
habits of going about the world.
For example, in the context of race-based legal claims, such as
discrimination or apportioning of voting districts, it would make little sense to
talk about race as an objective (historical or biological) category. Blackness in
America is anchored in actual history of oppression. If one's ancestors were
forcefully brought from Africa to be traded and enslaved, one is Black. But a
great deal of why race matters in law has less to do with determining who in
fact is connected to slavery and more to do with who is perceived as being
connected to it.82 New immigrants to the United States from Africa find that
American society often concludes that they are Black, and treats them in ways
informed by this assumption. Correspondingly, Blacks with concrete family
histories tracing back to slavery find that having an appearance (skin, hair,
manner of speaking) that is not stereotypically perceived as Black requires
them to actively define their relationship to their Blackness because their social
environment does not immediately associate their visible, manifested
characteristics with a racial category.
In appearance cases the question is not the existence of race underneath the
appearance, but the social response to bodies that manifest markers of racial
identity.83 If one can be Black or gay as long as he or she is not "in your face"
about it (that is, as long as he or she "covers," to invoke Yoshino's term), 84 then
the issue in a case in which an employee is fired for wearing cornrows is not
race in principle, but the specific way in which racial identity is performed
through its various markers. 85 There might be less racial discrimination if race
82. See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Semiotics and Law, in HI-FIVES: A TRIP TO SEMIOTICS 219, 228
(Roberta Kevelson ed., 1998) ("The contextuality and relationality of meaning, the derivation of identity
and definition from dissimilarity and contrast, do not imply that there is no reality. They do imply that,
although we may know things as they are in reality, we never can be sure that we do."); see also I
CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE: SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 30 (Nathan
Houser & Christian Kloesel eds., 1992) ("We have no power of thinking without signs."). For studies
that explore the ways in which race should be understood through its social perception and function, see,
e.g., Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-Century
South, 108 YALE L.J. 109 (1998); lan F. Haney L6pez, The Social Construction of Race: Some
Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994); and Daniel J.
Sharfstein, The Secret History of Race in the United States, 112 YALE L.J. 1473 (2003).
83. Robert Post developed this point in a poignant critique of the blindness myth in American
antidiscrimination doctrine. See Robert C. Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American
Antidiscrimination Law, in PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES, supra note 11, at 1. My project can be seen as
picking up where Post left off, and asking what it would look like were adjudication to abandon this
myth of blindness. If it is insufficient to consider race or sex only in the abstract, then can the law
maintain protection against race or sex discrimination even if it allows itself to become aware and take
into account the concrete appearances of its subjects?
84. See Yoshino, supra note I 1.
85. Diana Tietjens Meyers discusses the way in which prejudice is a matter of concrete
interpersonal interaction, not of principled negative standpoints. "Cultivating tolerance for diversity, for
example, is not just a matter of critiquing false stereotypes-that is changing your mind. Bigoted beliefs
are somaticized as comportment of which the bigoted individual is unaware-shrinking from contact,
keeping distance, and not looking at the Other while she or he is speaking." Diana Tietjens Meyers,
Who's There? Selfhood, Self-Regard and Social Relations, 20 HYPATIA 200, 204 (2005) (citation
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were an abstract concept without embodied appearances, ways, meanings, or
styles related to it.
The issue, then, is not what legal subjects are but how their habits and
practices constitute them to themselves and to the world. To the extent that the
question in appearance cases is legal subjects' identity, such identity would not
be captured by some stable essence. Any search for the "who" of the subject
standing before the law should first carefully define the object of the search.
Identity is dynamic and unstable, shaped and projected through constantly
negotiated tentative gestures rather than through decisive propositions. Identity
is located neither solely in what we think of as the form nor purely in what we
think of as the content of identity, but in the space between these two idealized
concepts.
In the context of the cases at hand, identities are handy social artifacts, not
realities. Our reliance on identity categories such as woman, Protestant, Asian,
creative, or disabled is nothing but shorthand for a set of characteristics that
have morphed from an accidental collection of qualities into a meaningful
amalgam through the creation of an identity category. Identities are ways of
seeing; they are a method of quick referencing and generalizing that is certainly
useful at times, but should not mislead us to think that what is used as a
shorthand reference actually exists, or at least that whether it actually exists is
relevant to adjudicating appearance cases. The picture that emerges from my
study of cases involving personal appearance is one of insistent judicial
attempts at taming markers and subjecting them to a desire for certainty in the
quick decipherability of identity. That is why I propose moving from identity to
personhood, a shift that will release us from futile categorization.
C. Appearance Cases of Minority Group Members Are Also About
Appearance, not Identity
In the cases examined thus far, the issue that the plaintiffs brought to court
concerned their appearance. As we have seen, the judicial inquiry shifted the
emphasis of these claims from the negative social response regarding the
plaintiffs' appearance to their underlying identity. The question turns from one
of epistemology (How do we know what we know about the plaintiffs?) to one
of ontology (What are the plaintiffs?). I showed that this focus on an identity
omitted); see also Alison M. Jaggar, Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology, in
WOMEN, KNOWLEDGE, AND REALITY: EXPLORATIONS IN FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY 129, 143 (Ann Garry
& Marilyn Perasall eds., 1989) ("Within a hierarchical society, the norms and values that predominate
tend to serve the interest of the dominant groups.... Whatever our color, we are likely to feel what
Irving Thalberg has called 'visceral racism'; whatever our sexual orientation, we are likely to be
homophobic; whatever our class, we are likely to be at least somewhat ambitious and competitive;
whatever our sex, we are likely to feel contempt for women. The emotional responses may be rooted in
us so deeply that they are relatively impervious to intellectual argument and may recur even when we
pay lip service to changed intellectual convictions.") (footnote omitted).
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that is supposed to underlie the appearance-and thus anchor it and legitimize
it-leads to unproductive and incoherent caselaw. In this Section, I turn to
cases in which identity was at the center of the claim in the first place:
Plaintiffs argued that their appearance should be protected because it was
related to their minority identity (their race, their national origin, etc.).
Although there are good doctrinal reasons to focus on identity in these types of
appearance cases (as opposed to the ones examined thus far), I argue that the
law should refrain from focusing on the plaintiffs' identity and resolve the issue
by remaining focused on the level of the role and significance of appearance
itself.
1. Not All Black Women Wear Cornrows
Renee Rogers, a Black airport operations agent, refused to abide by her
employer's request to change her cornrow hairstyle. 86 Her employer reasoned
that cornrows did not correspond with the professional image the airline wanted
to project. In its 1981 decision, the district court rejected Rogers's race
discrimination challenge to the policy,87 holding that the policy was not based
on race, but on hairstyle. Since hair is not a protected category under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, explained the court, Rogers had no
discrimination claim.
The decision suggests that in order for the judge deciding the case to be
convinced that the ground for her challenge was race and not simply hairstyle,
the plaintiff had to establish that cornrows are a reliable indicator of her race.
Rogers maintained that the cornrow hairstyle is of special significance for
Black women; that it "has been, historically, a fashion and style adopted by
Black American women, reflective of cultural, historical essence of the Black
women [sic] in American society.' '88 Furthermore, the style had been
popularized by public figures such as actress Cicely Tyson 89 and acquired
political significance through figures such as Malcolm X, who stressed the
meaning of afro hairstyles to Black pride.
90
That the cornrow hairstyle was a meaningful part of Rogers's racial
identity, and that there was evidence of a connection between Black women
86. Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
87. Rogers also argued sex-based discrimination, as well as a claim commonly referred to as
intersectionality, according to which she had been discriminated against as a Black woman. For the
purpose of the current discussion, however, it is sufficient to concentrate on her race discrimination
claim. The analysis I develop here could be similarly applied to her sex discrimination claim and to the
intersectionality claim. I focus on the race claim both because I think it presents more complex
challenges to the law and because I address sex discrimination claims in other cases analyzed in this
Article.
88. See Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231-32.
89. For Tyson's filmography see The Internet Movie Database, http://www.imdb.com/
name/nm000 1807 (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
90. See Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232.
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and cornrows, was insufficient for the judge. Not all Black women, he noted,
wear cornrows, and some white women wear cornrows too.9 1 In support of his
finding that cornrows are not a feature related to race, the judge observed that
the evidence indicated that Rogers had started coming to work with cornrows
right around the time when the hairstyle was being popularized by a white
actress-Bo Derek in the movie 10.92 This judicial exercise in reading popular
culture is worthy of attention because it operates to detach the cornrows from
their connection to Black identity.
For the judge, Bo Derek's cornrows indicated that Blacks do not have a
distinct relationship to cornrows; at least, not one that should be legally
recognized. By reaching this conclusion, the judge completed what political
philosopher Ann Norton dubbed as the traitstripping process. Norton offers a
compelling analysis of the way in which external features of marginalized
groups are appropriated by the hegemonic group:
In the first stage, a particular trait or constellation of traits is identified
with a particular liminal group. In the second stage another group,
nearer the center but nevertheless alienated from existing structures,
appropriates those traits, either rhetorically or through gestures.
Finally, the exercise or exhibition of these traits by the original carriers
is prevented through structure.
93
According to Norton's analysis, this appropriation of the margin's attribute
by the center (in the present case-Bo Derek's wearing of cornrows) does not
necessarily indicate tolerance or cultural pluralism.94  Despite the
91. Id. at 232. Compare Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000), in which the court
denied a homosexual employee's sex discrimination claim for reasons that resonate with the Rogers
decision's logic. The plaintiff argued that he was not harassed because of his sexual orientation but
because of his failure to conform to gender norms, regardless of his sexual orientation. The court was
willing to consider this line of argument in principle, but refused to accept it in the plaintiff's case due to
a lack of sufficient evidence that the plaintiff indeed behaved in a stereotypically feminine manner. The
court was quick to appease the readers' potential worry that this was a way to introduce sexual
orientation into Title VII through the back door, by explaining that "this theory would not bootstrap
protection for sexual orientation into Title VII because not all homosexual men are stereotypically
feminine, and not all heterosexual men are stereotypically masculine." In the context of this Article's
argument, this assertion is both promising and disappointing. It is promising because the court is
signaling that it would be willing to accept a claim by an individual plaintiff that shows that he was
harassed due to gender nonconformity. It is disappointing because prejudice against gays arguably
works such that the mere fact that someone is considered gay acts to ascribe feminine qualities to him
and causes him to be perceived as a man who does not conform to gender norms. So the fact that the
plaintiff was socially perceived as gay should have been an indication for the court that he was harassed
because he was seen as nonconforming with gender norms.
92. See Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232.
93. ANNE NORTON, REFLECTIONS ON POLITICAL IDENTITY 89-90 (1988).
94. Furthermore, by appropriating the stereotypical, salient, and almost caricature-like trait, the
dominant group rids itself of the need to consider the more subtle qualities of the marginalized group.
Qualities of the latter kind are harder to don and doff like a fashion accessory, and understanding them
would require a deeper, attentive dialogue with the minority culture. This point is well demonstrated by
the work of sociologist Annie Woodhouse, who analyzed the tendency of cross-dressers to adopt the
most salient stereotypes of femininity as a way to avoid the more complex and challenging aspects of
being a woman:
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mainstreaming of some of their traits, members of the marginalized group "may
find themselves praised in poetry, subordinate in law, claimed in rhetoric,
shunned in the world. The moments of praise and mythic brotherhood that
seem to expand the boundaries of the polity may not fulfill their promise."
95
It is thus doubtful that the judge's reliance on the appropriation of the
comrow hairstyle by a white actress expresses cultural tolerance and openness
to diversity.96 Another helpful way of understanding this judicial expectation in
which the cornrows would function as a stable marker of racial identity is to
think of them as what linguist William Labov calls "an accent of an accent."
Labov classifies certain pronunciation patterns among minority groups as
markers that have
particularly high visibility within and outside the community.... They
are the selection, inflection and reading of a whole system of accents
by a hostile community, a recuperation of the deviancy of the accents
by reducing it to something simple, manageable and under the control
of people outside the accent-community. So English speakers fancy
their "Irish" accent, Americans do their "Negro" take-off, and
Australians are delighted with their Aboriginal imitations.
97
Labov notes that such appropriation of a particular element of the accent
still leaves the imitated group behind in cultural capital: "In each case, the real
accent expresses the identity of the community, and excludes all other speakers.
The stereotype constitutes the counter-claim that membership of that speech
community is easy but worthless."
98
These theories of the social understandings of signs characteristic of
minority groups indicate that we should interpret white actress Bo Derek's
adoption of the cornrows with caution. Her (or the movie creators') seemingly
inclusive gesture may be something other than an indication of a tolerant,
pluralistic sentiment, or of respect to Black Americans' cultural practices. As in
the cases reviewed above, the court in Rogers looked for a clear and stable
nexus between the plaintiffs racial identity and the debated personal marker,
but concluded that this nexus was not stable enough to appease the judicial
logic.
[A]n understanding of gender clarifies the tendency for most transvestites to prefer an
appearance of extreme femininity, complete with stilettos, frilly underwear and tight clothes.
This kind of appearance ... permits an understanding of the behavioral changes associated
with cross-dressing by pointing to the fact that certain traits are out of bounds for 'real men',
and although some are changing these stereotypes, others are unable, or unwilling, to
incorporate these traits into their normal lives.
ANNIE WOODHOUSE, FANTASTIC WOMEN: SEX, GENDER AND TRANSVESTISM 142 (1989).
95. NORTON, supra note 93, at 89.
96. But cf. FORD, supra note 17, at 26 (claiming that a finding for the plaintiff in Rogers might
"reduce the number of non-Black women wearing the style as those women would also internalize the
legally disseminated message that the hairstyle was the cultural property of black women and conclude
that their adoption of the style would be inauthentic or even a type of cultural trespass. The result would
be an increased racial divergence in women's grooming.").
97. ROBERT HODGE & GUNTHER KRESS, SOCIAL SEMIOTICS 86 (1988) (describing Labov's theory).
98. Id.
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In critiquing this case, Kenji Yoshino and others have correctly argued
that comrows are a meaningful part of Black identity, thus suggesting that the
law recognize the performative relationship between hairstyle and race, or more
generally, between appearance and identity.99 Although this line of argument
importantly reflects the richness of Black identity (and of identity in general), it
ultimately fails to provide the tools that courts need when resolving such cases.
Essentially, accounts such as Yoshino's aspire to anchor the plaintiffs
hairstyle in her Black identity. In other words, they suggest that if the plaintiff
can demonstrate a stable nexus between her appearance and her identity, her
appearance should be legally recognized and protected.
This suggestion replicates the judicial logic described above. Both judges
and scholars assume that the crucial question determining whether a particular
appearance should be legally recognized is dependant on the plaintiff's ability
to establish a sufficiently tight connection between appearance and
"underlying" identity. Thus, the legal thinking becomes dichotomous: Either a
marker is telling the truth about one's identity and is thus worthy of protection,
or it is false or insufficiently stable, and thus unworthy of legal recognition. I
contend that the extent to which a sign is a reliable conveyer of its bearer's
identity is simply irrelevant for resolving appearance disputes. The analytical
rigor in appearance cases should not be dedicated to questioning the reliability
of the connection betweep appearance and identity, for the semiotics of racial
identity are much more multifaceted than such an inquiry suggests. Just
because the vocabulary of hairstyles associated with Blacks is not employed
exclusively by this group should not empty this vocabulary of its meaning.
00
Judicial and scholarly inquiry into the meaning of appearance should not aspire
to unearth the appearance by reaching a deeper and more substantial reality
beneath it, but rather to remain on the level of appearance itself
Rogers' claim that she was discriminated against on the basis of race
should have been accepted based on the reasoning that it was indeed not her
99. Yoshino, supra note 11, at 893-6; Caldwell, supra note 11, at 383-5.
100. There is a slightly more complex reading of the Rogers case. Such a reading would suggest
that it is precisely because the court recognized the power of comrows to signify Blackness that it
refrained from recognizing this hairstyle as a sign of racial identity. Such a reading would point to the
force of the idea of blindness in American antidiscrimination doctrine. According to this interpretation,
the court was reluctant to recognize that Blacks might look different (even if only in their hairstyle)
because it was operating according to the notion that equality entails similarity: if differences between
the races are recognized and legitimized, the ideal of equality before the law might be endangered.
Caldwell argues convincingly that this is indeed how American Airlines saw the cornrows. That is,
Rogers suffered adverse employment consequences because she looked too Black, which contradicted
the image that the company wished to project to its costumers. See Caldwell, supra note 11, at 375-80;
see also Lauren Berlant, National Brands/National Body: Imitation of Life, in THE PHANTOM PUBLIC
SPHERE 173 (Bruce Robbins ed., 1993) (providing a cultural analysis of imposed "covering" in the
public lives of Black women); Dorothy E. Roberts, Why Culture Matters to Law: The Difference Politics
Makes, in CULTURAL PLURALISM, IDENTITY POLITICS, AND THE LAW 85, 90 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R.
Keams eds., 1999) (arguing that white conventions of appearance shaped American Airlines' notion of




race alone that prompted the disparate treatment, but the appearance associated
with this race, or the embodied concreteness of her racial identity.'
0'
Interlude II. Considering Volition in Appearance
This is an appropriate place to pause to consider the role of the judicial
procedure in shaping the parties' stories and molding them into an argument
comprehensible to the law. According to the account provided by the opinion in
Rogers, people know exactly why they choose one hairstyle over another. They
intend for their hairstyle to make a specific assertion about their identity. Every
hairstyle is a message, and should be a reliable message at that. The cases
analyzed in this Article reflect a similar understanding of the meaning of
appearance: For example, if one is wearing a dress, one could be understood as
claiming to be a cross-dresser. I would like to suggest that the process of
becoming a certain appearance is more complex, fragile, and bidirectional than
the simple choice model provided by appearance caselaw.
We should take into account the possibility that the reshaping of Rogers's
hair into a legal claim made it seem to have a much more decisive message
than it originally had. In other words, it is unclear whether when Rogers
braided her hair into cornrows, she did so as a conscious way of conveying her
racial identity. We should therefore consider the ways in which legal doctrine
and procedure shape our understanding of the issue at hand. We should look for
the elements of the story that are being overlooked by those (like us) learning
about it from the legal text that depicted it in order to resolve it legally. In the
current case, for example, it is important that we ask in what ways the meaning
and function of Renee Rogers's cornrows changed from the day that her lawyer
argued about the significance of her hairstyle in a court of law. Rogers's
lawyers argued, as indicated above, that the cornrows were part of her racial
identity. But does this mean that this was Rogers's premeditated, intended
purpose in braiding her hair into comrows?
I suggest that we should allow room for the possibility that when Rogers
first braided her hair it was not a result of a crystallized notion and a well-
articulated motivation regarding the meaning of the cornrows and the racial
message she wanted to convey through them. Plausibly, Rogers did not think of
this act solely as an expression of her racial identity. In fact, she may not have
thought about the meaning, the motivation, and the message of this act at all. 
°2
101. See Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How "Color Blindness " Discourse
Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, in PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES, supra note 11, at 99
(arguing that formal race discourse is status based and thus maintains "a bizarrely abstract conception of
discrimination" in its failing to take into account the social valence of race).
102. Again, the analogy of appearance to poetry is helpful in realizing that intention is not central
to the meaning making of appearance.
"A poem should not mean but be." A poem can be only through its meaning-since its
medium is words-yet it is, simply is-in the sense that we have no excuse for inquiring
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Consider how a certain hairstyle becomes ours. Most of the time, we
cannot explain every haircut we get with a well-reasoned rationale. This is not
to say that hairstyles mean nothing, or that we should not be interested in their
meaning. Rather, I argue that in the context of appearance, relating hairstyles to
fully controllable and willful choice is inappropriate. As Don Herzog observed,
even a hair choice that attempts to detach itself from any meaning by appearing
casual will not escape interpretation. A hairstyle that seems simpler and
requires less time, hair products, and accessories should not be interpreted as
purely functional or instrumental; rather it's just a change in the
reigning codes. That is, someone whose hairstyle is simple doesn't
escape making any symbolic claims, even if he wants to. Instead, he
claims-depending on the local code-to be classically austere,
athletically disciplined, vigorously masculine, hardnosed, efficiency-
minded, or whatever else. And he will effortlessly be read as pressing
those claims, even if he doesn't intend to, even if he is oblivious to the
code. 103
There is no escaping interpretation of the way we appear, and we cannot
fully control the spectrum of possible interpretations of our appearance. But
this is exactly the point that the prevalent legal logic misses: By asking legal
subjects to be fully accountable and in control of the meaning and message of
their appearance, the law reflects a misunderstanding of the way in which
appearance acquires meaning.
Our legal theory needs to develop a more subtle and responsive mode of
interpreting the meaning of personal markers. Such an approach will need to
reflect an understanding of the way in which appearance ensues, and to
incorporate the realization that although hair provides material for "reading"
other people, the material to be read does not necessarily make a well-crafted
what part is intended or meant. Poetry is a feat of style by which a complex of meaning is
handled all at once .... In this respect poetry differs from practical messages, which are
successful if and only if we correctly infer the intention.
TODD F. DAVIS & KENNETH WOMACK, FORMALIST CRITICISM AND READER-RESPONSE THEORY 20
(quoting W.K. Wimsatt & Monroe C. Beardsley, The Intentional Fallacy, in W.K. WIMSATT, THE
VERBAL ICON: STUDIES IN THE MEANING OF POETRY 4-5 (Univ. Press of Ky. 1954)).
103. DON HERZOG, POISONING THE MINDS OF THE LOWER ORDERS 463 (1998). To complicate
things even further, we are usually not satisfied with what the hair itselftells us-we want to know the
intentions of its bearer. When we see a haircut that is "dressed down" we want to know whether its
wearer is really absent-minded about his or her hair, or whether he or she is studiously dressing the hair
down. Thus, again, in reading appearance we are driven to look for what motivations and personality
traits lie under the appearance. See also KAREN HALTTIUNEN, CONFIDENCE MEN & PAINTED WOMEN: A
STUDY OF MIDDLE-CLASS CULTURE IN AMERICA, 1830-1870, at 63-66 (1982) (discussing the problem
of signaling simplicity through fashion-an artifact which is bound to be constructed and disingenuous);
WOODHOUSE, supra note 94, at 77-78 ("[A]ll appearance is constructed. Regardless of whether we are
talking about high fashion, anti-fashion or non-fashion, all appearances are making statements in one
way or another."); Barbara D. Miller, The Disappearance of the Oiled Braid: Indian Adolescent Female
Hairstyles in North America, in HAIR: ITS POWER AND MEANING IN ASIAN CULTURES 259, 277 (Alf
Hiltebeitel & Barbara D. Miller eds., 1998) ("There is no way to avoid the message power of hair. Even
if you cover it with a hat or scarf, it still talks.").
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argument. 10 4 Hairstyle choices are a result of a mixed, usually unarticulated
(and perhaps not even capable of articulation) combination of factors of diverse
natures. The reasons or motivations for choosing a hairstyle can run from the
practical to the aesthetic, or, indeed, the ideological. Comrows might be
considered practical, in that they are less damaging to the hair than "relaxing"
it, and they require time investment only once in a while rather than daily
attention. Or cornrows might be considered aesthetic if they are currently in
vogue, or if their wearer has a sense that they complement her hair. Finally,
cornrows may be an ideological choice if they are construed as an affirmative
symbol of Black pride. These considerations, however, often mesh into one
another, and it is hard to neatly separate them. In addition, they are always
constructed within a cultural context, and thus can never be purely owned and
controlled by the individual sporting the hairstyle. Just as any language that we
use is never solely ours (for there is no private language), 10 5 the personal
markers we bear, even if we can describe them as chosen to a certain extent, are
also a result of the marks that our culture and social settings leave on us.
106
"There is a forcible affect of language which courses like blood through its
speakers," writes Denise Riley. "Language is impersonal: its working through
and across us is indifferent to us, yet in the same blow it constitutes the fibre of
the personal."' 07 Riley's interrogation of the extent to which we choose our
words is applicable to the language of personal appearance as well. We should
be interested, according to Riley, "not so much [in] How To Do Things with
Words, as Austin's title had it, but How Words Do Things With Us. And that
'with us'-as distinct from 'to us'-is pivotal. If language exerts a torsion on
its users, it does not immobilize them .. ,,108
104. "Reading... is a belated and all-but-impossible act, and if strong is always a misreading.
Literary meaning tends to become more under-determined even as literary language becomes more over-
determined. Criticism may not always be an act of judging, but it is always an act of deciding, and what
it tries to decide is meaning." HAROLD BLOOM, A MAP OF MISREADING 3 (1975).
105. JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE EDGE OF MEANING 123 (2001) ("[T]he language [a person trying to
make sense of his experience] uses is a social and cultural artifact, made largely by others, and the
expectations by which it works must be taken as facts of the world with which he must deal. One cannot
simply make up a new language, for example, even if such a thing were imaginable.") See also JOHN E.
JOSEPH ET AL., LANDMARKS IN LINGUISTIC THOUGHT II, at 25 (2001) (describing linguistic
structuralism's understanding that "however arbitrary most linguistic signs may be, the link between
signifier and signified is maintained in such a strong form by the social nature of language that no one
can change it.").
106. See Charles Taylor, The Person, in THE CATEGORY OF THE PERSON: ANTHROPOLOGY,
PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY 257, 275 (Michael Carrithers et al. eds., 1985) ("The ideal of understanding
oneself all alone strangely ignores the way in which understanding requires language, and language is
bound to conversation. The clarity language brings through articulation is linked with the clarity through
presentation in public space .... We learn language in conversation, and hence the original acquisition
of articulacy is something we do, rather than I do. Later we learn to do it to some extent on our own. But
we do so in a language which is ours, and hence in principle our formulations should always be capable
of being common formulations.").
107. DENISE RILEY, IMPERSONAL PASSION: LANGUAGE AS AFFECT 1 (2005).
108. Id. at 3. But see JOSEPH ET AL., supra note 105, at 10 (discussing Edward Sapir's notion that
language has a tyrannical hold on our experience and orientation in the world).
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As sociologists such as Pierre Bourdieu and Erving Goffmann have
repeatedly reminded us, 10 9 our taste and our notions of appearance propriety
could never be understood as unrelated to our social position, with its covert
ideologies, power divisions, and meaningful identity roles and distinctions.
Thus, there is an important sense in which to describe our hairstyle choices as
choices would be to misrepresent them. Myriad minute motivations and vague
sensibilities shape our hair choices, which resist understanding through
categories such as "intended message" or "clear meaning."' 10 A conscious
inquiry about the reason for our hairstyle is not part of how the hairstyle
becomes ours.
We should consider the possibility that Rogers's braiding of cornrows was
much less premeditated and laden with identity claims than the opinion implies.
For Rogers, the cornrows may have been an unremarkable hairstyle, as
plausible as many others, a choice that came naturally and did not require a
pause to contemplate its meaning, certainly not its meaning as a claim about
identity. 1 "
I stress that we should consider the extent to which it was the scrutiny of
the comrows by the legal gaze that transformed them into an identity claim.
Under the current state of the law, litigating appearance disputes requires
articulating the rationale behind appearance. By its nature, though, appearance
resists articulation into a-clear-cut claim. Personal markers often are not just
unarticulated; they are inarticulable.
As literary scholar Susan Stewart notes, when objects are described in
detail, they gain an ideological meaning that had not necessarily been there
prior to the lingual description:
Minute description reduces the object to its signifying properties, and
this reduction of physical dimensions results in a multiplication of
109. See generally PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGEMENT OF
TASTE (Richard Nice trans., 1979); ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE
(1959).
110. This reminds me of White's observation that a poem "cannot be reduced to a statement of this
or that theory or message, to optimism or pessimism, or any other paraphrase." A poem (and in our
context, I would argue, a personal marker), "is in fact a kind of speech with which 'stating views' or
'having a theory' or 'delivering a message' is inconsistent; the very form of the poem is critical of the
assumptions on which such speech rests." JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION 8 (1990)
(emphasis added); see also Derek Attridge, Closing Statement: Linguistics and Poetics in Retrospect, in
THE STYLISTICS READER 36, 41 (Jean Jacques Weber ed., 1996) ("[I]n poetry, features of language
which are usually merely the carriers of semantic content and have no importance in themselves and
therefore no relations among themselves other than contiguity, gain that importance and enter into such
relations.").
111. The dual meaning of the word "habit" reflects the way in which clothes and bodily practices
become involuntary and transparent, unaccounted for, and unthought-of ways in which we get dressed or
comb our hair. Compare one of the archaic meanings of "[b]odily apparel or attire; clothing, raiment,
dress" with one of the more contemporary meanings, "[a] settled disposition or tendency to act in a
certain way, especially one acquired by frequent repetition of the same act until it becomes almost or
quite involuntary." Oxford English Dictionary Online, http://dictionary.oed.com (enter "habit"; then
click "Find Word") (last visited July 21, 2006).
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ideological properties .... When verbal description attempts to
approximate visual depiction, we find a further reduction of sensory
dimensions and, because of the history of the word as utterance in
lived social practices, an even greater ideological significance.'
12
As Rogers articulated her request for legal protection of her appearance,
her hair was molded into an argument that the law could make sense of. But
appearance is more analogous to a poetic occurrence than to an argument. It is
the search for ways to establish legal protection for the cornrows that attributed
to this hairstyle the sole function of signifying race."3
Certain appearances can certainly be related to certain identities, but the
existence of this relationship is not (and should not be expected to be)
conclusive, whereby the appearance indexes the identity. Like any sign,
personal markers will fail a test that expects that they will only be used to
indicate the truth. This is inherent in their nature as markers. The very moment
that they start functioning as signs, they become unstable-for signs can be
appropriated and used by anyone to express anything. As Umberto Eco
pointedly observed, this capacity to tell lies is what makes signs what they are:
"If something cannot be used to tell a lie, conversely it cannot be used to tell
the truth: it cannot in fact be used 'to tell' at all."' 14
The moment in which a nonsemiotic phenomenon such as a rash on the
skin or smoke from afar becomes a sign is, according to Eco, the moment it is
conventionally recognized as a vehicle for something else:
The first doctor who discovered a sort of constant relationship between
an array of red spots on the patient's face and a given disease
(measles) made an inference: but insofar as this relationship has been
made conventional and has been registered as such in medical treatises
a semiotic convention has been established. There is a sign every time
a human group decides to use and to recognize something as the
vehicle of something else. 115
For judges and lawmakers to stipulate that personal markers should be
indexical 116 of identity in order to be legally recognized is to misunderstand
112. SUSAN STEWART, ON LONGING: NARRATIVES OF THE MINIATURE, THE GIGANTIC, THE
SOUVENIR, THE COLLECTION 47-48 (1984).
113. Yoshino similarly suggests causality: American Airlines' rejection of her comrows made them
more important to her because it rendered them a site of resistance, a sign of anti-assimilation. Yoshino,
supra note 11, at 896.
114. UMBERTO ECO, A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS 7 (1976); see also MARCEL DANESI & PAUL
PERRON, ANALYZING CULTURES 45 (1999) (discussing Eco's definition of semiotics). Socrates, in
treating the relationship between things and their names, observed: "But then how ridiculous would be
the effect of names on things, if they were exactly the same with them! For they would be the doubles of
them, and no one would be able to determine which were the names and which were the realities."
PLATO, Cratylus, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 427, 466 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington
Cairns eds., Lane Cooper et al. trans., 1963).
115. ECO, supra note 114, at 17 (internal citation omitted).
116. Drawing on semiotics theory, I mean this term in its Peircian sense, according to which
indexical signifiers bear direct relations to their signifieds. The most intuitively accessible example
would be natural symptoms or signals (pain as an index of illness; smoke as an index of fire; a bell-ring
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both personal markers and identity. There will never be a hairstyle that is or
could potentially be worn only by Blacks, or a name that is exclusively and
inherently a girls' name, 117 or an accent belonging only to people of French
nationality. But this does not mean that there are no hairstyles that convey,
maintain, and perform Black identity. Markers such as hair, by their very
nature, can never be anchored to a single identity group in a manner stable
enough to appease the prevailing legal logic. In the context of appearance
cases, the law's search for stability and certainty of signs is therefore a futile
search. Cornrows are indeed related to racial identity, but the nature of this
relation is poetic, not instrumental. They are neither a biologically "natural"
and immutable indication, nor a purely volitional and mutable expression of
race.
The markers currently subject to litigation are located at the edge of the
self, both literally and conceptually. They are an interface-a boundary
between self and other, and at the same time a bridge toward this other. They
are also, to draw on James Boyd White's phrase, at the "edge of meaning"
11 8
because they are meaningful in a way that challenges us to change our impulses
and habits of reading appearance. Rather than treating markers as transparent
vehicles of the information that supposedly lies beneath them, we should
recognize that their materiality is inherent to their meaning. For example, the
meaning of appearance depends on the fabric and lines of a shirt; the sound,
rhythm, and connotations of a name;" 9 or the attitudes and moods evoked by
whether one says tomato or tomahto. Any meaning that markers might convey
is inseparable from such specifics as their particular texture and tone as well as
from the contexts in which they are employed. Meaning also emerges from the
relations between the shirt and the rest of its wearer's attire, and from the social
setting in which the shirt is worn.
as an index that somebody is at the door). For a discussion of Peirce's typology of signs, see DANIEL
CHANDLER, SEMIOTICS: THE BASics 36-45 (2002); see also Thomas A. Sebeok, Pandora's Box: How
and Why To Communicate 10,000 Years into the Future, in ON SIGNS 448, 456-57, 465 (Marshall
Blonsky ed., 1985).
117. The division between girls' and boys' names is often not strict, and is prone to cultural
changes. See Stanley Lieberson, Susan Dumais, & Shyon Baumann, The Instability of Androgynous
Names: The Symbolic Maintenance of Gender Boundaries, 105 AM. J. SOC. 1249-87 (2000) (studying
eighty years of Ohio naming practices and the change in femininity or masculinity ascribed to certain
first names).
118. The ways in which meaning resides in language itself, and in qualities such as tone, cadence,
or other qualities of form rather than semantic meaning is at the basis of White's exploration in this
book. See WHITE, THE EDGE OF MEANING, supra note 105. If White's main interest is in the "way to
live as expressive beings in a world full of constraint and limit, including on our own minds and
imagination," id. at xii, mine can be described as examining how the law can remain a responsive reader
of its expressive subjects.
119. "It's evident that a first name pins you relentlessly into your place of emergence, by its class
overtones, its clumsiness or its melody, its religiosity, its cultural timbre, its brief fashionability." RILEY,
supra note 107, at 118.
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Appearance claims challenge the law to acknowledge and accommodate
markers' complexity of meaning without subjecting appearance to a mode of
reading that seeks clear-cut answers and single meanings.
2. Talking the Talk is Just as Important as Walking the Walk. Language as
Appearance
Garcia v. Gloor, a language rights case, illustrates the judicial urge to
evaluate markers only insofar as they are tied to identity.' Here, the court
claimed the ability to transcend appearance in its diagnosis of a subject's true
identity.
Hector Garcia was a salesman in a lumber store that served both English
and Spanish-speaking clientele.' The employer "had a rule prohibiting
employees from speaking Spanish on the job unless they were communicating
with Spanish-speaking customers," or on break. 122 Garcia testified he was fired
when "he was asked a question by another Mexican-American employee about
an item requested by a customer and he responded in Spanish that the article
was not available. [An officer of Gloor] overheard the conversation. Thereafter,
Mr. Garcia was discharged., 123 The plaintiff-appellant argued that his discharge
amounted to discrimination based on national origin, contrary to Title VII.
12 4
He testified that since Spanish was his primary language and the one he was
most familiar with, the English-only rule was difficult to follow.
125
Faithful to the logic of demanding a tight nexus between identity and
appearance, the court approached the question of the place of language in the
plaintiffs life by examining whether Spanish was inherently related to his
identity. 126 What was his identity, then? The court treated the task of
determining the plaintiffs national origin as if it were plainly apparent to the
120. 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980). The plaintiff's and the defendant's competing accounts about
language in this case convey the same uncertainty as in the other cases discussed above. It is an
uncertainty about whether to classify language either as an immutable characteristic or as a voluntary
choice. The plaintiff suggests that his usage of Spanish neither merely reflects his preexisting Hispanic
background nor is a matter of arbitrary preference. It is not a reflection of his Mexicanness, but a way of
maintaining Mexican identity through speaking it and marking it. Accordingly, language rights are an
unstable and highly debatable category in current law. See Juan F. Perea, English-Only Rules and the
Right to Speak One's Primary Language in the Workplace, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 265, 266 (1990)
("[E]ventually the Court will have to resolve this issue [of whether English-only rules amount to
employment discrimination]. It is certain to recur. The numbers [of Hispanics in the American
employment market] alone guarantee it.").
121. Garcia, 618 F.2d at 266. Seven of the eight salesmen employed at the store were Hispanic. Id.
at 267. The court observed that this is "a matter perhaps of business necessity, because 75% of the
population in its business area [Brownsville, Texas] is of Hispanic background and many of Gloor's
customers wish to be waited on by a salesman who speaks Spanish." Id. at 267.
122. Id. at 266.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 268.
125. Id. at 266.
126. Seeid. at270.
2007]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
naked eye, holding that the plaintiff was not discriminated against based on
national origin, since, according to the objective legal diagnosis, he was not of
foreign national origin.' 27 In examining how the court reached this conclusion,
we should note the detailed and careful enumeration of the factors contributing
to the conclusion that Garcia is truly American:
Hector Garcia, who was twenty-four years of age at the time of trial,
completed the first semester of the tenth grade in Texas public schools.
He speaks both English and Spanish. His grandparents were
immigrants from Mexico; he is a native-born, but he has always
spoken Spanish in his own household.'
28
From Garcia's number of semesters in public school, the court made the
almost clinical inference that "Mr. Garcia was fully bilingual. He chose
deliberately to speak Spanish instead of English while actually at work. He was
permitted to speak the language he preferred during work breaks. 12 9
Although he spoke Spanish in reply to a question asked by a colleague, and
although the court recognized that he grew up speaking Spanish at home and
that he maintains that Spanish is his most familiar language, 130 the court
asserted:
No claim is made that Garcia and the other employees engaged in sales
were unable to speak English. Indeed, it is conceded that all could do
so and that this ability was an occupational qualification because of the
requirement that they wait on customers who spoke only English or
who used that language by choice. Nor are we confronted with a case
where an employee inadvertently slipped into using a more familiar
tongue. 131
My critique is not that the court erred in its fact-finding, that is, that Garcia
is in fact "more" Mexican than American. Rather, the problem is the manner in
which Garcia's claim for a connection to Spanish was framed as an issue that
depends on a factual determination of his national identity.' 32 Once the question
127. Id.
128. Id. at 266.
129. Id. at 268.
130. According to the opinion, language is part of one's national origin only if one is indeed
"really" foreign as a matter of factual finding. The court thus recognizes only one direction of the
connection between identity and language: if one is of foreign nationality, it is natural that one would
speak a foreign language. But it was inconceivable for the court that the practice of speaking Spanish
might be part of constituting and maintaining one's Hispanic identity.
We do not denigrate the importance of a person's language of preference or other aspects of
his national, ethnic or racial self-identification. Differences in language and other cultural
attributes may not be used as a fulcrum for discrimination. However, the English-only rule,
as applied by Gloor to Mr. Garcia, did not forbid cultural expression to persons for whom
compliance with it might impose hardship.
Id. at 270.
131. Id.
132. Historian David Hollinger observes:
Who decides what your identity is? The United States has always practiced identity-
ascription, that is, the ascribing of identity to individuals whatever their own personal
preferences may be. That's why it makes sense to speak of"a political economy of identity,"
according to which identity is a kind of commodity distributed by authority. A variation on
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is presented as one of a tight and natural nexus between nationality and
language, no room is allowed for the real question this case warrants.
The apt question in this case is political, involving the envisioned model of
the American public sphere: What if Garcia indeed could have spoken English
just as well as Spanish, and repeatedly chose the latter as his spoken language?
This question goes unnoticed-if not actually suppressed-by the court.
Garcia's claim should not have succeeded or failed according to his linguistic
biography. With language, as with any other marker, it is hard to point to the
exact moment when it becomes "natural," even when it might have been
chosen in the first place.
However, any claim of a "slip of the tongue" was denied to Garcia, since
the court decided that he was not a "true Mexican." For the court, Garcia's
claim to have an intimate relation to Spanish was disingenuous. Lisa Delpit
points to the way in which language is intuitive, and rightfully claims that it is
hard to understand it in terms of choice:
Our home language is as viscerally tied to our being as existence itself
... . Just as our skin provides us with a means to negotiate our
interactions with the world-both in how we perceive our
surroundings and in how those around us perceive us-our language
plays an equally pivotal role in determining who we are.133
As Delpit's last sentence suggests, even if language is chosen, our choice
of language has more than merely technical implications. Our language shapes
who we are, what we can think, and what we can say. As White notes, "[M]uch
of the meaning of what we say is not to be found in our minds or intentions at
all, but in the language itself."'
134
The court did not recognize any intermediate area between choice and
habit.' 35 Rather, the nature of national identity was taken as self-evident.
this tradition in recent years has been to expect individuals to voluntarily identify themselves
in exactly the terms that a potentially prejudiced white person might. This variation has
developed because the United States has become understandably uncomfortable with having
government officials going around.., awarding this or that classification to individuals.
Americans want to classify, but not too much.
Hollinger, supra note 7, at 44. We can detect in the Garcia judgment a tone of reproach, suggesting that,
to the court's mind, the plaintiff should have identified himself as bilingual and not really Hispanic.
133. Lisa Delpit, Introduction, in THE SKIN THAT WE SPEAK: THOUGHTS ON LANGUAGE AND
CULTURE IN THE CLASSROOM, at i, xvii (Lisa Delpit & Joanne Kilgour Dowdy eds., 2002).
134. WHITE, THE EDGE OF MEANING, supra note 105, at 36.
135. Cf Gutierrez v. Mun. Ct., 838 F.2d 1031, 1039 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot, 490 U.S.
1016 (1989). (Indicating a willingness to perceive language as more than a matter of objective national
origin, and stating that "the mere fact that an employee is bilingual does not eliminate the relationship
between his primary language and the culture that is derived from his national origin."). See also Garcia
v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993), reh'g denied, 13 F.3d 296 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 512 U.S. 1228 (1994); cf EEOC v. Premier Operator Serv. Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 550 (N.D. Tex.
1999) (observing that Gloor v. Garcia's ruling did not govern the present case, because employees were
forbidden to speak Spanish at all times, including breaks, phone calls, and before and after work on
employer's premises).
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"Americaness" and "Mexicanness" were treated as stable and objective
categories, impossible to obtain by markers or practices. 136
The Garcia decision denies a role for the language one uses in constituting
one's identity. Just as hairstyles or names have no role in constituting identity
but merely reflect it, language does not determine one's national origin. Rather,
the court posits national origin as a prior, more basic fact, determined by
factors such as where one was born and how many semesters one studied in an
American public school. 137 The logic of natural, immutable, "real," identity
informs the entire case. Once Garcia was "diagnosed" as being of American
national origin, he was not entitled to negotiate assimilation, because
assimilation did not pertain to him. The court decided that he was an American
and should not only walk the walk but also talk the talk.
138
In Rogers, the court demonstrated an inability to consider how race
operates socially through concrete, racialized bodies. Race is considered in the
abstract, detached from the realities in which people of color physically appear
and disconnected from how they are perceived. Similarly, in Garcia, the court
defined national origin as nothing more than a birthplace, rejecting any
accounts of how environment shapes practice, appearance, preference, and
habit.' 
39
136. Both in Gloor v. Garcia and in Rogers the question of markers was determined through a
judicial assessment of whether it was natural and inherent to the plaintiff's assumed identity. "To a
person who speaks only one tongue or to a person who has difficulty using another language than the
one spoken in his home, language might well be an immutable characteristic like skin color, sex or place
of birth." Garcia, 618 F.2d at 270. Similarly, the Rogers court stated, "Plaintiff may be correct that an
employer's policy prohibiting the 'Afro/bush' style might offend Title VII .... But if so, this chiefly
would be because banning a natural hairstyle would implicate the policies underlying the prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of immutale characteristics ... an all-braided hairstyle is a different matter.
It is not the product of natural hair growth but of artifice" Rogers, 527 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
137. See Brubaker & Cooper, supra note 80, at 5 ("We should seek to explain the process and
mechanisms through which what has been called the 'political fiction' of the 'nation' .. . can crystallize,
at certain moments, as a powerful, compelling reality. But we should avoid unintentionally reproducing
or reinforcing such reification by uncritically adopting categories of practice as categories of analysis.").
138. Implicit in the plaintiff's claim in Garcia is a defiance of the ideology of assimilation: Garcia
could be accepted into the club of true Americans, and yet he stubbornly chose to cling to the country
and culture of his ancestors. As Zygmunt Bauman observed, national acculturation projects expose the
ultimate failure of assimilation, by making apparent
[t]he evidently acquired character of cultural traits gained in the process of acculturation
jarred with the inherited and ascribed nature of national membership only thinly covered by
the formula of common culture .... [T]he national community, though itself a product of
culture, could sustain its modality as a nation only through emphatic denial of a 'merely
cultural', i.e., artificial, foundation. Instead it derived its identity from the myth of common
origin and naturalness.
BAUMAN, supra note 39, at 142-43.
139. [T]here is no disparate impact if the rule is one that the affected employee can readily
observe and nonobservance is a matter of individual preference. Mr. Garcia could readily
comply with the speak-English-only rule; as to him nonobservance was a matter of choice
.... [Title VIII does not support an interpretation that equates the language an employee
prefers to use with his national origin.
Garcia, 618 F.2d at 270. An additional parallel between Rogers and Garcia is that in Rogers, the court
was dissatisfied that the plaintiff could not demonstrate that the employer discriminated against Blacks
in general (because there were many Black employees in the airline). Similarly, here, the court's
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National origin, like any identity category recognized by the law, is
portrayed in the Garcia decision as a matter of plain and apparent fact,
unrelated to practices or markers that may be associated with it. Title VII
jurisprudence should widen its scope to consider the experience of those who
appear to be Hispanic, even if they are not legally defined as such by the factual
data relating to their birthplace and degree of fluency in English and Spanish.
We should ask whether a legal conception of national origin can hold if it
excludes any consideration of the ways of being of that national origin. The
judicial attempt to cling to an understanding of identity as an abstract essence
of ideal-type categories, stripped from concrete, particular, and embodied
manifestations, is neither convincing nor useful.
D. Scholarly Treatments of Appearance Cases Remain in the Identity Trap
Scholarly attention given to appearance cases has flourished in the last
decade as jurists recognize that these cases challenge law's basic analytical
tools and raise important questions about the boundaries of constitutional
principles. But like the caselaw, the existing appearance scholarship has been
unsuccessful in transcending the identity trap and developing alternative
normative approaches to appearance. Scholarly treatments of appearance cases
usually approach the issue of personal markers as inherently related to the
politics of identity. Kenji Yoshino argues that courts should recognize the
"covering" burden on minorities-that is, the pressure to assimilate and
disguise the remarkable aspects of their racial, sexual, or gendered identity.
140
Exploring the regulation of appearance under the framework of forced
assimilation, Yoshino maintains that gays, people of color, and women face a
pressure to cover their different appearances, a predicament to which the law
fails to respond. Antidiscrimination law, he argues, should integrate into its
framework the fact that identities have significant performative aspects.
14 1
Devon Carbado and Mito Gulati similarly seek to highlight the extra burden on
minorities who are required to adopt the attire, lifestyle, and manners of speech
of the dominant group in order to be considered professional.'
Such analysis is immensely important in that it thickens our understanding
of the extent to which appearance is constitutive of social identity. It also
reasoning relied on the fact that there were many Hispanics in the workplace in question. Such an
analysis fails to see that the Black or the Hispanic whose presence is accepted is the one who is
unmarked by racial and ethnic difference, the one who did not embody racial or ethnic identity as did the
plaintiffs in Rogers or Garcia. See id. at 267 ("Of its 39 employees, 31 were Hispanic, and a Hispanic
sat on the Board of Directors. There is no contention that Gloor discriminated against Hispanic-
Americans in any other way.").
140. See Yoshino, supra note 11, at 875.
141. Id.
142. See Carbado & Gulati, Conversations at Work, supra note 11; Carbado & Gulati, Working
Identity, supra note 11.
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provides invaluable accounts of the intricacies of appearance regulation for
underrepresented groups. However, concentrating on identity-based appearance
claims comes with a price. While I agree that the regulation of personal
appearance has more often been the plight of marginalized groups, I maintain
that the problems of appearance and of identity have been unnecessarily
conflated. Disaggregating appearance from identity would provide better legal
protection to appearance claims of minority groups, as well as produce a more
coherent legal treatment of appearance.
Indeed, it is no wonder that most appearance cases involve claimants from
under-represented groups. Contests over appearance usually reach the court due
to intolerant social responses to personal characteristics that stand out since
they do not abide by hegemonic conventions. But scholarly analysis that
considers markers only to the extent that they are related to identity is bound to
repeat the same mistake as the caselaw, namely conceiving of the nexus
between identity and appearance as much tighter and more stable than it
actually is and thus presenting an unattainable standard to plaintiffs claiming
legal protection for their appearance.
Like courts, scholars trying to grapple with appearance cases face the
challenge of offering the law, whose logic is averse to uncertainties, a way to
deal with the fragile connection between appearance and identity. By focusing
on the ways in which the identities of gays, Blacks, and women are visually
noticeable, current legal scholarship neglects and thus neutralizes the way in
which every identity is constituted and maintained through extemal markers.
Personhood involves an ongoing expressivity-even the unmarked, mainstream
identity of, say, the white, able-bodied, straight, middle-class male.
This scholarship does an important job in highlighting the invisible yet
prevalent forms in which power operates on oppressed groups on even the
subtlest levels. More specifically, it has created a rich account of the voices and
experiences of groups who have been blocked from equal participation for
generations, and who today, after formal barriers have been officially removed,
face the challenge of "sticking out" due to their minority identity. They are
often part of a very small group of Blacks in the law firm, Hispanics in the
fancy restaurant, women on the bench, or openly gay members of parliament.
While this identity-based approach to appearance cases contributes to the
understanding of identity and of the challenges faced by members of minority
groups, it does not enhance our understanding of the complexities of
appearance. That is, while this scholarship rightfully calls for expanding the
scope of the protection of minorities by recognizing appearance as a significant
aspect of identity, it does not manage to provide a viable model for this
protection because its argument depends on the link between identity and
appearance (in other words, the argument depends on the existence of identity
in the literal sense: identity between one's essence and one's appearance).
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Similar to the approach emerging from the caselaw, we end up with a model
that would find it hard to provide legal protection to Black women who wear
cornrows or to second-generation Hispanics who speak Spanish in their
workplaces. If appearance should be protected only as far as it signifies
minority identity, then, as we know, there are also white women who wear
cornrows, and non-Hispanics who speak Spanish. It is precisely because of this
potential appropriation of signs by anyone, regardless of their identity, that
courts refuse to recognize the claim that cornrows could be an important aspect
of blackness or that Spanish is a meaningful part of Hispanic identity. The
alternative to this conceptual trap, developed in the second Part of this Article,
is to frame appearance as part of a universal human experience.
Nan Hunter observed that some identities are expressive by the mere fact
that they are different (gays, Black, or even pregnant women can be perceived
as sending messages without intending to signify anything, through their mere
visibility). 43 This, she notes, muddies the legal analysis, since the same issue
(such as the right of a private organizer of a St. Patrick's Day parade to exclude
a gay and lesbian group from marching) 144 is sometimes classified as a question
of freedom of expression, and sometimes as a question of equality.
Accordingly, in certain situations appearance is understood as conduct, and in
others, it is understood as status. Hunter offers the term "expressive identity" to
help explain how some people, without any intention of expressing a message
through their appearance, are more visible and draw more intolerant responses
simply because they belong to a minority group.
Hunter's account is useful in that it shifts the focus of identity to the social
event in which identity is performed and perceived. However, her analysis is
burdened in that she does not go far enough in its application. By focusing on
the ways in which identities of gays, Blacks, and women are "expressive," that
is, visible and salient, Hunter neglects and thus neutralizes the way in which
every identity is constituted and maintained through ongoing expressivity-
including the identity of members of unmarked, mainstream identity groups.
Hunter's model does not attend to the fragility and performance of every social
actor: We all impersonate.
The cases examined in this Article manifest social actors' irritation or
anxiety about the uncertainty of reading appearance. Such uncertainty is
inherent to the social condition. As social beings, we live with constant
interpretive uncertainty as to the identities of those around us. This is a chronic,
incurable state. Our social arrangements prescribe, for example, that our police
officers wear a uniform, but we can never be sure that the uniformed man
143. See Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissent for Equality, 35 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 1 (2000).
144. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995)
(holding that parade organizers have a right to exclude a group whose mere presence will send a
message that the organizers oppose).
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asking us to pull over is in fact a police officer, not even if we take the
precaution of asking to see his badge. The risk that he is an imposter is always
present.145 Moreover, intentional deceit is not the only source of interpretive
uncertainty. Consider a more nuanced case of police impersonation-that of
"uniformed security guards employed by stores to discourage shoplifting." 146
As Paul Fussel comments, "[t]he real police must make sure that the security
guards' uniforms are not-as the stores hope they will be-easily confused
with actual police garb. Some commercial guards hope to resemble police by
carrying their cell phones in black leather holsters, just as if they were
pistols." 147 Uniforms, like any other marker, inherently depend upon allusions.
They receive authoritative meaning for their audience through the homage they
pay to other traditions of uniform and insignia. Quotations, associative
references, and variations are the means through which uniforms function. The
blurry line between the appearance of the real police officer and the ordinary
shop guard is something we can do nothing about. Such allusions to other styles
are part of the language of clothes and other markers, and most importantly,
they are what renders this language viable. The reason that our uncertainty in
telling the guard from the true police officer bothers us is that knowing the true
nature of the uniform-wearer reinforces our sense of mastery of the vocabulary
of appearance. Knowing the actual truth beneath the identity eases our
persistent anxiety that we might not be literate enough readers of appearance,
or that we might lag behind everyone else in the game of orientation in the
social world.
The issue in appearance cases is the basic instability of markers, and the
social anxiety that this instability produces. Uncertainties about determining
whether to believe appearances are omnipresent, and this challenge of when
and how much to trust appearances is an inherent part of life. Appearance cases
arise when the state, a school, or an employer surrenders to the idealized
longing for a social world in which identities can be safely deciphered by
appearance, and rejects people with appearances that it views as open to too
many interpretations. Thus, the central question that should guide the
jurisprudence of appearance is to what extent the law should be responsive to
social unease about markers that resist easy deciphering.
Hunter and other scholars who approach the issue from the perspective of
identity politics imply (perhaps unwittingly) that only a marker that could be
clearly and tightly connected to an identity could be legally protected. But this
line of argument leads to a dead end, for no personal marker, by its very nature
as a marker, is ever going to be tied securely enough to any given identity.
145. See, e.g., Demian Bulwa, Man Seized in Marin Hits Captor in Face and Runs to Safety, S.F.
CHRON., Jan. 22, 2007, at Al (discussing an FBI agent impostor who handcuffed a jogger, hoping to
receive ransom for his release).




There will always be the white woman who wears cornrows, and this
indeterminacy will pull the rug out from under the Black woman's claim that
cornrows are a stable marker of race. Moreover, to ask an individual to
articulate the justifications and the claims behind her marker is to distort what
markers do and the way in which they do it. Markers have meaning, but this
meaning cannot be reshaped in the form of an identity claim, as judges expect.
My suggestion for a poetic understanding of appearance would open up an
appreciation of markers as not transparent and instrumental representations of
identity, yet still central to the self.
While I agree that the regulation of markers has been more the plight of
marginalized groups, I think the two issues have been unnecessarily conflated,
and that separating them would provide analytical clarity that would benefit
both subjects. An analysis that considers markers only to the extent that they
are related to identity is bound to repeat the same mistake as the caselaw, for it
assumes, suggests, and affirms a false sense of the tight nexus between identity
and appearance.
Kimberly Yuracko has recently proposed an analysis that is driven by
insights similar to mine. 148 She criticizes both the courts and the scholarly
analyses for their readiness to protect only traits that are strictly associated with
group identity. 149 Yuracko rightfully contends that it is unclear which traits
would be sufficiently close to a given minority identity to be legally protected.
In addition, she notes the danger of reification and stereotyping of particular
traits. 150 Accordingly, she proposes a complex set of criteria to determine when
a trait should be protected. For example, it would not be sufficient for a person
to argue that a given trait signifies his racial identity. Rather, in order to
recognize the importance of a particular trait to identity, factors such as the
prevalence of a trait among the minority group and its significance for the
group would need to be examined as well. The legal response should then be
different if sixty percent or one percent of Black people wore cornrows.
151
Similarly, the law should take into account whether or not group members
themselves strongly associate the trait with the group. If this is the case, then
148. See generally Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Race Discrimination: An Argument About
Assimilation, supra note 11.
149. See id. at 384 ("As a practical matter, making antidiscrimination protection rise or fall on
whether a trait is group-identified puts too much weight on a categorization that is not well-defined
enough to bear it. It is not at all clear how one determines whether a trait is group-identified enough to
warrant protection.").
150. See id. at 384-85. A similar objection is raised by Richard Ford, who is worried that protecting
identity-based differences might limit the freedom of minorities and reinforce flat stereotypical images
of them. See FORD, supra note 17, at 123 ("[W]e should resist the temptation to write a speculative
sociology of group difference into law or to enlist the state in psychotherapeutic quest to validated (sic)
,repressed' identities.").
151. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Race Discrimination: An Argument About Assimilation,
supra note 11, at 411.
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even if certain members decided not to bear the trait, they might equally be
offended if employers requested the specific trait be covered -up.' 
52
Despite the more complex approach to the relationship between identity
and appearance proposed by Yuracko, her model still focuses on protecting the
appearances of minority group members. "The more the motive for the trait
discrimination looks status-based, the more the trait requirement becomes
illegitimate and deserving of scrutiny," she argues. 153 This is where my
proposed approach departs from Yuracko's. As I show in Part II below,
developing a legal approach that would recognize that appearance is a loaded
and fragile aspect of all human experience would not only be a more coherent
response to the complex dynamics of appearance, but would also provide a
better legal response to the appearance claims of minority groups.
To summarize, current appearance caselaw is wrong in focusing on legal
subjects' identities rather than on their contested appearances, which are the
actual center of the dispute. This leads to law which only recognizes
appearance if it can be anchored in an underlying identity. But how can we cut
the Gordian knot between appearance and identity? How do we render the law
more responsive to claims such as that of a female employee who would not
wear makeup, or of a Black employee who wants to keep her cornrows, without
searching for the link between appearance and identity? In Part II, I examine a
way out of the identity-centered approach to appearance cases. I propose
looking at appearance not as a matter relevant only to members of minority
groups, but as a universal aspect of human experience. According to this
analytical framework, it becomes possible to recognize that appearance is
related to identity in more complex ways than simply marking it or accurately
reflecting it. It becomes clear, for instance, that it is often difficult to pinpoint
the chain of cause and effect and determine which came first: the appearance or
the identity. For example, was the plaintiff first a cross-dresser who then started
wearing women's clothes, or were the two processes interrelated? It also
becomes clear that personal markers such as clothes, hairstyles, or names are
related not so much to "what" we are, but to "how" we are. Appearance is a
matter of texture, a way of being in the world, and such personal qualities are
often hard to articulate in words-especially in the form of propositions or
clear-cut categories. This is why I suggest that the law rely on the paradigm of
poetic language to understand how appearance creates meaning in individuals'
lives.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 413.
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II. TOOLS FOR ESCAPING THE IDENTITY TRAP
This Part examines appearance cases that take a different approach than the
identity-centered cases reviewed in Part I. The cases studied below succeed in
treating appearance cases without resorting to the plaintiffs' identities, and
provide a more responsive and convincing account of appearance adjudication.
In reading the following cases, my goal is to extrapolate the principles that
guided them in resolving appearance disputes. Section A examines a case in
which the plaintiff seeking legal protection for his appearance was a member of
the unremarkable majority and studies the way the court treated such an
appearance claim. Namely, the court focused on the connection of appearance
to personhood, rather than to identity. Section B studies cases in which the
identity of the plaintiffs was a central issue in their appearance claims-they
were all Canadians of Sikh faith, seeking accommodation of their religious
emblems in different contexts. In contrast to the approach used by the
American courts, the Canadian courts manage to resolve the appearance claims
while remaining in the domain of appearance rather than inquiring into the
extent to which appearance is related to identity. Section C summarizes the
conceptual approaches that can be extrapolated from these cases. I suggest that
the theory of appearance emerging from this identity-free caselaw could serve
us well in rethinking the approach to be used in resolving appearance cases.
A. From Identity to Personhood: Nofv. The State of Israel
Even if we agree that the previously described decisions are troubling
insofar as they reflect a simplistic understanding of identity, the question still
remains: Can we renounce identity as the basis for appearance rights? Can we
protect appearance rights without firmly anchoring appearance in identity? And
how are we to maintain the political usefulness of the concept of identity and
protect identity-based rights while refraining from reifying identities and
rendering them confining and oppressive, rather than meaningful and enriching
ways of understanding ourselves? 154 In order to keep the vocabulary of identity
viable, the law should remain constantly alert to the limitations of this
vocabulary. The following case demonstrates such alertness to the complexity
of identity and appearance.
During the 1991 Gulf War, Israel distributed gas masks to its population.
The standard mask did not properly seal bearded faces, and bearded men had to
use a special mask that was more than twice as expensive. The Israeli
154. Riley addresses the dangers of identity categorization in observing that the "proliferating self-
descriptions, as encouraged by a present historical moment of petrification in 'the politics of the
personal' only accumulate yet more candidates for embalming in the Museum of Me. This is the sort of
practical difficulty which shadows those altering versions of the self pronounced by new kinds of
identification which aim to liberalize yet which can paralyze." See RILEY, supra note 107, at 6.
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government decided to fund those special masks for bearded men, but only to
those who would sign a declaration stating that they grew their beard for
religious reasons. Akiva Nof, a bearded man for more than twenty years,
petitioned Israel's High Court of Justice, challenging the government's decision
that secular bearded men had to shave their beards in order to abide by
government safety recommendations. 155 The two legal bases for his petition
were that the government's policy treated religious and secular people
differently, thus amounting to religious discrimination, and violation of the
petitioner's human dignity.
Israel's Supreme Court first examined the sources and significance behind
growing a beard among religious communities in Israel. It found that the
practice of refraining from shaving was not a formal Halakha (Jewish law)
requirement. Yet, the Court recognized that, as a convention among observant
Jewish men, the practice of growing a beard was a well-established custom
with rich meanings, and thus part and parcel of their way of life. It is worth
stressing that the Court did not stipulate that for the beard to be legally
recognized it needed to amount to a religious duty. Rather, it was sufficient for
it to be a meaningful convention, which is part of the personhood and everyday
practices of many religious men. We can thus already recognize a departure
from the logic delineated in the identity-centered cases we have seen in Part I.
The Court was willing to recognize the importance of a certain appearance to a
particular identity group even if it was not a stable sign of religion: Not all
religious men have beards, and some non-religious men wear them as well.
156
The emphasis of the inquiry moves away from the truthfulness of the
information that the marker conveys about its bearer to the marker's meaning
and significance for its bearer. The bearded Israeli citizens who are religious,
received recognition of their beard based not on the function of the beard in
reflecting their identity, but rather due to the importance of the beard in their
world.
But what of the petitioner, who could not ground the beard in religious
meaning or community custom? If the Court were to apply the logic of the
cases discussed earlier, it would look for an identity in which the beard could
be anchored, and would quickly realize that the problem for the petitioner was
that no such identity category was available. In other words, this was neither a
religious man's beard nor a hippie's beard, nor, even, a beard belonging to
someone with a note from the doctor confirming that he had skin problems and
could not often shave. In the identity-centered cases, this finding would have
resolved the matter: no identity category, so no protection for the marker. But
here, the Court took another route in describing the significance and function of
155. See HCJ 205/94 Nofv. Israel [1997] IsrSC 50(5) 449.
156. Recall that in Rogers, the plaintiffs discrimination claim was dismissed because not all Black
women wore cornrows and some White women wore them. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 229.
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the beard. Rather than looking for an identity underlying the beard, the judges
examined the meaning of the beard to the petitioner's personhood. In this, they
recognized that, despite the Petitioner's inability to anchor the beard in a clear
identity category, the beard had become, for him,
a part not only of his figure but also of his being. In this respect, there
is no difference between those who grow their beard for reasons
related to their religious faith and those who do so for other reasons.
Whether one is religious or secular, with the passage of time the beard
becomes an integral part of him. How he perceives himself and how he
is perceived by others are one and the same.1
57
The distinction between one's "figure" and one's "being" reflects an
understanding of the interplay between the public persona and the private sense
of self, between how one is seen by others and how one understands oneself.
158
The beard has become part of how the petitioner is perceived by his social
environment, and thus it is important to him and to his sense of self. This case
develops a complex and nuanced theory about the role of appearance in human
experience. It reflects an understanding that marking, or being marked, is part
of individuation: Marking is part of being considered a person by one's social
environment and by one's own self-understanding. 159  Impersonation,
maintaining a persona or a particular figure, is thus inherent to personhood.160
Furthermore, personhood, according to this opinion, does not precede
appearance; rather, there is a bidirectional movement between one's look and
one's experience of oneself, or self-understanding. This judicial text refuses to
inquire about the petitioner's identity prior to his beard and independently of
his interactions with others. Like all men, the petitioner is not an autonomous
entity whose identity can be examined outside its social context and its
concrete, embodied, and socially meaningful manifestations. The Court refuses
to imply either that the meaning of the beard was created solely by the
157. Nof IsrSC 50(5) at 457. The translations from the Hebrew are mine.
158. Our bodies and the material aspects of social interaction are important features as well as
signs of who we and others are and, as such, feature our identities in practice .... If this self
is at all extraordinary, it's extraordinarily mundane. If it has constancy, it is as stable as the
patterns and accompanying material signs of our relationships.
HOLSTEIN & GUBRIUM, supra note 81, at 24.
159. A labor relations arbitrator overruled an employer's ban on beards on similar grounds. Finding
that there was no production-related reason to forbid beards, the arbitrator found the no-beard rule to be
inherently suspect, explaining that "[w]earing a beard is a matter of personal image, indeed, it may be an
expression of personality." See Fairmont-Zarda Dairy, 106 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 583 (1995) (cited in
Michael J. Yelnosky, What Do Unions Do About Appearance Codes, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y
521 (2007)).
160. Fictional and biographical narratives that treat the difficulty involved in changing physical
appearance abound. Individuals worry that external changes will be perceived by society as too harsh a
transformation, as a discontinuity. One of the most moving texts of this sort describes the decision of a
middle-aged man to stop dyeing his hair, and his qualms and worries about his white roots revealing the
fact that he had been dying his hair. See JOSE SARAMAGO, THE HISTORY OF THE SIEGE OF LISBON 185-
88 (Giovanni Pontiero trans., Harvest 1998) (1989).
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petitioner, or that it was created solely by his social surroundings. The beard
and its bearer occur within an interplay of meaning making.
The appropriate distinction, according to the Court, is not between
religious and non-religious beards (or in our terms, between beards that
reference a particular identity and ones that do not), but rather between those
whose beards have become part of their personas and senses of self (what the
judgment calls "being" and "figure") and those whose beards have not acquired
such significance. The Court therefore accepted the Petitioner's arguments that
the religious/nonreligious distinction was discriminatory on the basis of
religion, and that the beard was part of the petitioner's right to dignity, a
constitutionally protected right under Israeli law. Indeed, while the Court
recognized that the beard was part of who the petitioner was, it saw no need to
articulate a clear-cut identity category that defined the petitioner, because it saw
no need to anchor the beard in a specific identity.
The terminology used in the opinion indicates its approach. Throughout the
judicial opinion, the petitioner is referred to as "a bearded person."' 62 1 find this
formulation promising, because it manages to grant centrality to the beard as
something more than a mere external and mutable appearance without reducing
the person to his beard.1 63 The decision acknowledged that when people meet
the petitioner, they see him, among other things, through his beard, and that
trying to isolate the beard in order to determine what exactly it represents about
his identity would be missing the point, for the surface texture of his identity is
integral to any understanding of it. Appearance is thus part of the texture and
poetics of personhood.1 64
It seems that this way of refusing to separate the bearer from the beard, and
the beard from the social context in which it operates, would correspond to how
Renee Rogers (the airline employee) related to her cornrows 1 65 Like poems,
161. By using the verb to occur I wish to stress that the meaning of the beard does not exist in
itself, but must be understood through the context in which it is invoked and read. See WHITE, supra
note 110, at xi ("[O]ur words get much of their meaning from the gesture of which they are a part, which
in turn gets its meaning largely from the context against which it is a performance."); see also JEROME J.
MCGANN, THE TEXTUAL CONDITION 10-11 (1991) (arguing that meaning is neither solely "in the text"
nor solely "in the readers," but arise from variables "found on both sides of the textual transaction").
162. In Hebrew, ba 'al zakan. The literal translation would be "beard owner," but the ownership
connotation is salient in the English translation more than in Hebrew.
163. This way of capturing the relationship between the beard and the person brings to mind the
terminology of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000)). The act
shifted the term for disabled people from "cripples" or "handicapped" in previous legislation to "persons
with disabilities." Thus, while one's disability is important to recognize, it does not exhaust one's full
scope of personhood. See SIMI LINTON, CLAIMING DISABILITY: KNOWLEDGE AND IDENTITY, 8-33
(1998) (analyzing the implications of the shifts in terminology regarding disability).
164. See RICHARD BRADFORD, STYLISTICS: THE NEW CRITICAL IDIOM 16 (1997) ("Words are
made up of sound and stress, identified respectively by the phoneme and the syllable. The function of
sound and stress in non-poetic language [in contrast to their function in poetry] is functional and
utilitarian: before we understand the operative relation between nouns, verbs, adjectives and connectives
we need to be able to relate the sound and structure of a word to its meaning.").
165. See supra Part I.C.
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personal markers are not reducible to the ontological information they contain
or to an argument they make.166 To expect the beard to tell us something about
Akiva Nof is to measure it by its usefulness in conveying truthful information.
This, the Court realized, is not the main function of appearance. The reasoning
in the Nof case reflects an understanding that appearance cannot be equated to a
propositional statement. I suggest that the Court understood appearance not as a
propositional statement, but rather as something closer in its mode of meaning
to poetic expression; it found a way to provide legal recognition to a mode of
appearing that is neither purely chosen, contingent, and instrumental, nor
purely unwitting, natural, and immutable:167 a mode not propositional but
suggestive, exploratory, and performative.
168
Since the Court did not have an identity category on which to base the
protection of the petitioner's beard, it relied on the petitioner's right to
protection of his dignity, and it did so in a way that relates to my suggestions of
the limited expressibility of the meaning of markers. By locating the beard as
part of the petitioner's dignity, the Court delineates a protective circle around
the indescribable. Realizing that the beard can be important to the petitioner in
ways that resist categorical justifications, the Court used dignity as a
mechanism to waive the demand that the legal subject articulate that which
cannot be articulated.
.As if to demonstrate the minor importance of classifications and categories
in appearance cases, Justice Mazza explicitly noted that he did not think there
was much importance in classifying whether the beard was a matter of freedom
of expression, autonomy, or privacy. What mattered to the Court was that the
beard mattered to Nof. And here, the subject of dignity was not only the
bearded person, but also the inexpressible nature of his plight. In other words,
the Court recognized that it would be a violation of dignity not only to have the
person shave his beard, but also to ask him to produce a clinical typology of
how and why the beard mattered.
The last and perhaps most important element of the case that should be
stressed is its recognition of the limitation of language in describing
appearance, and in this case particularly, in expressing the meaning of the
beard in its bearer's life. While the identity-centered decisions we saw in Part I
required the litigants to depict and re-articulate their appearances through a
166. See WHITE, supra note 110.
167. Riley similarly draws an axis of traits that vary from the random to the inherent, or from the
more chosen to the more unwitting: "The name hovers at some midpoint between the tattoo and the state
register: the formal identity displayed by a passport or a social security number can readily be stolen but
then replaced by a fresh number because it doesn't inhere, it's not embedded in the flesh-hence the
great strength of the tattoo, which is." RILEY, supra note 107, at 117.
168. This understanding of the function of markers is parallel to White's understanding of
language: "[Lianguage is not a code into which messages are translated so much as an activity, a set of
gestures, like dance, say, or music, and its most important meaning lie in the particulars of
performance." WHITE, supra note 105, at 109.
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language of categories and propositions in order to justify them, this decision
resisted such an impulse. It recognized that the beard is partly idiosyncratic;
like a poem, it would be hard to articulate what it is and rephrase what it does.
It recognized, in other words, that appearance is non-repeatable.' 69 The
following Interlude develops this point and explores the modes in which
appearance creates meaning.
Interlude III. Appearance, Poetics, and the Boundaries of Language
The task of describing the meaning of a beard, a particular dress style, or a
name puts us in touch with the limits of language's capacity. To the extent that
personal markers are describable, they are describable through figurative,
metaphorical language. The fundamental problem in the prevailing legal
treatment of personal appearance is a preoccupation with the extent to which it
corresponds to the reality that supposedly lies beneath it. A more apt
understanding of markers would have to account for their intermediate nature,
as neither purely contingent nor fully intentional. Furthermore, it is futile to
treat markers as either inherent/natural (and thus reliable representations of
their bearer's identity) or disconnected/artificial (and thus potentially
superficial and misleading with regard to their bearer's identity). Whereas the
law treats personal markers as conveyers of what the legal subject claims to be
through his or her appearance (i.e., as conveyers of identity), markers tell us not
the what but the how of identity: Appearance has more to do with what we
might call the texture of the self and its ways of going about the world, and less
with a predetermined essence.170 This approach to understanding markers such
as hair, dress, or names would neither dismiss them as inessential and thus
extricable from the legal subject's "true identity," nor elevate them to a status
that is inextricably tied to the representation of the subject's identity.
Drawing on certain strands in twentieth-century literary criticism, I suggest
poetic language as a model for understanding how external markers create
meaning. 17 1 Poetic language shifts the focus of reading from looking for
169. See Martha Nussbaum's nuanced treatment of the tension between general qualities and non-
repeatable elements of the individual. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, Love and the Individual: Romantic
Rightness and Platonic Aspiration, in LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE
314 (1990). 1 elaborated on the boundaries of language in relation to appearance litigation in Yofi
Tirosh, Martha Nussbaum's Love and the Individual: On the Boundaries of Language and the Non-
Repeatable Characteristics of Legal Subjects, in LOVE AND LAW 433 (Orna Ben-Natfali & Hana Naveh
eds., Tel Aviv University Press 2005) [Hebrew].
170. Recall that in Hernandez-Montiel, the Board of Immigration Appeals denied the plaintiff's
asylum application because the plaintiff was persecuted "because of the way he dressed ... and not
because he is a homosexual." Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1089 (9th Cir. 2000).
171. 1 do not wish to make general claims about some universal nature of poetic language. I draw
on ways of approaching poetry that are generally associated with twentieth-century criticism. These
critical strands represent a heightened awareness to the materiality of poetic language and to the
importance of form and internal organization. Most notably, the critics I draw on can be associated with
formalism, new criticism, and current articulations of neo-formalist approaches. The sensitivities
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meaning outside the poem ("behind" its language, as if its words are only
vehicles for a meaning that lies outside of them) to looking for what the poem
does on its surface, or within the medium that constitutes it. Similarly, personal
markers are not transparent vehicles of information about their bearers, and
thus the law's instrumental approach to markers is erroneous. Rather, like
poetry, appearance's medium itself and the social context in which it occurs are
essential to the work it performs. Accommodating this intermediacy of markers
would require appearance adjudication to endure much more uncertainty and
complexity regarding the meaning of markers than it currently tolerates.
However, bold recognition of this complexity is the only convincing and
productive path to pursue if we seek to design law that is responsive to the
intricate challenges of its subjects' lives as social beings.
In Nof, the inexpressibility of what appearance does or of why it matters
did not discourage the Court-and should not discourage us-from developing
a theory for understanding appearance and incorporating personal markers into
the visual field of the law. James Boyd White stresses that we should not
mistake the inexpressible for the unreal: "Each of us is a circle of experiences
and meaning that can occasionally, through language, meet or overlap with
others, at least at the edges .... What lies beyond language is real all right, but
it is not communicable, certainly not in a language of concepts."
' 173
Assessing the significance of the petitioner's beard, the Court reflected a
similar understanding. It recognized that some of what is real to us and about us
is inexpressible (at least through general categories), but that such
inexpressibility cannot free our political and legal arrangements from attending
to those "circles of experiences." Thus, the law's treatment of the beard
remained respectful, despite the fact that it was difficult to describe its
importance to its bearer in concrete and functional terms. Difficulty expressing
part of our experience or an aspect of our being does not require that this
experience remain completely extralegal; the law need not treat experiences
that lack an easily decipherable meaning as meaningless.
Poetic language can, at times, alleviate some of the difficulty of expressing
the nature, meaning, and effect of appearance. Metaphorical or poetic language
can mitigate the incommunicability of markers. Consider how lovers turn to
metaphor to describe their loved-ones, because they feel that there are no
illustrated by such approaches could be useful for a jurisprudence of identity. My invocation of poetic
criticism is motivated not by an interest to make claims about poetry; rather, the approach to poetry that
I draw on makes intuitive sense to us as contemporary readers and serves to clarify the kind of reading I
suggest we apply to appearance. See, e.g., Herbert Tucker, The Fix of Form: An Open Letter, 27
VICTORIAN LITERATURE & CULTURE 531 (1999) (providing an informal review of trends in twentieth-
century literary criticism as setting the stage for contemporary neo-formalism). In my view, the qualities
of poetic language that I emphasize here are not unique to poetry; they are qualities inherent to language
in general. Poetry is a genre in which those qualities are more readily apparent, and this is why I invoke
this mode rather than language in general.
172. HCJ 205/94 Nofv. Israel [1997] lsrSC 50(5) 449.
173. WHITE, supra note 105, at 35.
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ready-made words to convey what they see in their love-object and,
particularly, how they see it. In the Song of Solomon, which gave us some of
the most compelling poetic expressions of love, the lovers say to each other,
"As the lily among thorns, so is my love among the daughters./ As the apple
tree among the trees of the wood, so is my beloved among the sons."'
17 4
Suppose that the fair sister from the Song of Solomon wanted to describe her
loved one to a good friend. Turning to generalities such as his age, occupation,
or nationality may have the power to typify the lover for technical or
bureaucratic identification purposes, but it would not capture "what he's like,"
or who he is for his lover-and "what he's like," or the "how" rather than the
"what" of the individual-is what lovers primarily relate to in one another.' 75
But while figurative speech can help capture one's unique "texture" where
generalizations would not suffice, sometimes even this non-categorical mode of
expression encounters the boundaries of expressibility. Examples of the
inability of language to express minute details about one's uniqueness abound
in literature and poetry. Consider Ira Gershwin's lyrics for the Fred and Ginger
classic, "Shall We Dance": "The way you wear your hat/ The way you sip your
teal The memory of all that/ No, no they can't take that away from me." 176 No
language will suffice to describe the exact way in which the loved-one is
unique. In her distress, all the lover can do is point to the fact that her lover is
unique in ways words cannot capture. But although the exact nature of these
traits is indescribable, they are still the qualities that best capture the loved-one
in his lover's eyes: There is a particular way in which he sips his tea, but she
cannot quite describe this way beyond pointing to the fact that it exists.
This song asks what it would take to recall someone's identity or person. It
replies that what matters for remembering a loved-one is not so much what he
was, but the way he was. In bringing markers to the fore, appearance cases are,
similarly, much more about people's characteristics-the ones that make them
who they are both to themselves and to the world-and not about the general
categories to which they belong (such as age, race, sex, occupation, etc.). The
cases studied in this Article, then, are about the self's texture and ways, styles
and habits, and not its internally fixed core essence.
Poetic expression, like appearance, is located on the blurry line between
chosen and unwitting, and between informative and non-instrumental. The
meaning of poetry occurs only through the interaction with its reader. That is,
talking about the meaning of the poem is only coherent when we talk about its
174. Song of Solomon 2:2-3 (King James).
175. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 169 (presenting the difficulty in the Platonic conception of love,
which concentrates the repeatable and generalizable foundations of the loved-one's soul, and siding with
Aristotle's conception of love as inherently dependent on unrepeatable and concrete qualities of the
loved-one).
176. IRA GERSHWIN & GEORGE GERSHWIN, They Can't Take that Away from Me, on SHALL WE
DANCE? (RKO Radio Pictures 1937).
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meaning to someone, and within a particular context. 177 Similarly, it would not
make much sense to talk about the universal and independent meaning of a
certain hairstyle or name. Markers never have meaning independent of context,
but receive their meaning through the social interactions in which they operate.
These meanings, therefore, vary according to cultural context. Thus, the law
must relate to the meaning of appearance within the social settings in which it
transpires.
Another way in which poetic expression is a helpful analogy to appearance
lies in the fact that poetic language works less to represent a reality behind the
words or to convey information accurately and functionally and more on the
terrain of the medium, of language itself.178 In poems, words operate not (or at
least not mainly) through their definitional meaning, but rather their poetic
work is done through their relations to other words in the language system.
Poetic statements are not, to quote White, "language-free, but language-bound
and language-centered."'' 79 Analogously, personal markers are not reducible to
other terms, but, to continue with White's characterization of poems, express
their meaning through their form. A name or a hairstyle does not function as a
transparent representation of the identity that supposedly lies underneath it. It is
not a proposition or a claim. Markers work mainly on their own terrain, as part
of a language of signs. The concrete, non-repeatable, and non re-describable
materiality of clothes or names is essential to what they do. The current
adjudication of appearance seeks to reduce markers into truth claims, aiming to
suggest that they are only important in so far as they accurately reflect their
bearer's identity. Drawing on the jargon of semiotics, appearance cases are
about what signs do as signs, in relation to other signs and within the system of
signs, more than about what signs do with regard to their referents.'
80
Clothes, names, and other external markers are never devoid of meaning.
Markers have a semiotic function, and there is no getting around this. But
177. Stanley Fish illustrates this point vividly in describing a chain of subsequent interpretations to
the same text written on a blackboard, depending on the context in which the text was presented. See
STANLEY FISH, Is There a Text in This Class?, in THE STANLEY FISH READER 38 (H. Aram Veeser ed.,
1999); see also DAVIS & WOMACK, supra note 102, at 60-61 (discussing Jonathan Culler's structuralist
approach, by which the same text can have different meanings, depending on the reader and on the
genre).
178. "Form," it should be remembered, is a word that has several meanings, some of which
are near opposites. Form has to do with the structure or outward appearance of something,
but it also has to do with its essence. In discussions of poetry, form is a powerful word for
just that reason: structure and essence seem to come together, as do the disposition of words
and their meanings.
MARK STRAND, THE WEATHER OF WORDS: POETIC INVENTION 69 (2000).
179. WHITE, supra note 105, at 42.
180. The paradigmatic exposition of this approach was done by Saussure. See FERDINAND DE
SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS (Wade Baskin trans., 1996) (1916); see also V. TEJERA,
SEMIOTICS FROM PEIRCE TO BARTHES: A CONCEPTUAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF
COMMUNICATION, INTERPRETATION AND EXPRESSION 7 (1988) (discussing semiotics theories that hold
that "any social interaction-not just linguistic interaction-necessarily involve significations, selves,
shared meanings").
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markers do not translate into a clear-cut identity claim. Constraining legal
subjects to rearticulate their appearance in the form of an identity claim empties
the language of names and dress style (and other ways of being and appearing)
of its meaning. Jerome McGann articulates the main locus of poetic meaning:
The object of poetry is to display the textual condition. Poetry is
language that calls attention to itself, that takes its own textual
activities as its ground subject. To say this is not at all to say that
poetic texts lack polemical, moral, or ideological materials and
functions. The practice of language takes place within those domains.
But poetical texts operate to display their own practices, to put them
forward as the subject of attention.
181
The challenge for the law, as my case analysis suggests, is to develop a
way of reading personal markers poetically. While names and clothes carry
meaning, it is a meaning that resists the narrow true-or-false interpretive
approach currently employed by most of the caselaw. Reading markers by their
function as identity labels, as is the current mode of judicial analysis, is in fact
a misreading. I hope not only to shed light upon these misreadings, but also to
suggest an alternative way of adjudicating appearance, which would provide a
more nuanced way for the law to talk about identity than the one currently
available.
The analogy of personal appearance to poetic language helps to clarify that
the law's expectation that its subjects rephrase, translate, or convert their
appearance into a claim about their identity is unmerited. Just as trying to
paraphrase a poem into an argument or a message would be not only futile but
also disrespectful of the way in which poems operate, it would be wrong for
our law to ask its subjects to mark themselves clearly and with determination as
to the meaning of their appearance.
B. Canadian Law's Treatment of Sikh Appearance Cases
My reliance on Nof as a case that could guide new thinking about the
identity-centered appearance cases studied in Part I could be challenged with an
argument that the Nof Court recognized the appearance claim of a middle-class
man who is not part of a sexual, ethnic, or racial minority merely because his
appearance was not controversial in any way and did not cross the boundaries
of tolerance to subversive or unconventional messages. Nof was part of the
hegemonic majority, whereas the plaintiffs in the other appearance cases were
members of minority groups. In response to this critique, this Section analyzes
Canadian caselaw dealing with the accommodation of Sikh immigrants'
appearance. The plaintiffs in these cases are members of a minority group, and
their appearance (which includes turbans, kirpans, and other Sikh insignia and
181. McGANN, supra note 161, at 10-11.
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items of traditional attire) is related to their minority identity. Nonetheless, like
the Israeli Court in Nof, the Canadian courts adjudicating these cases did not
resort to an underlying Sikh identity to justify the plaintiffs' appearance.
Instead, the courts concentrated on the legitimacy of the negative social
response to Canadians who wear Sikh insignia, and on the meaning and
function of the appearance in the lives of the legal subjects.
In Grant v. Canada182 the plaintiffs challenged a reform in the uniform
code of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) (affectionately referred to
as "mounties" by Canadians). 183 As part of a policy to incorporate minorities
into the police force, the reform created special accommodations for Sikh men
who wore customary Sikh emblems such as a beard and turban. The regulations
permitted Sikh police members to wear a turban issued by the RCMP, made of
the color and material of the suede Stetson cap worn by non-Sikh officers. In
addition, Sikh police officers were allowed to keep their facial hair, provided
that the facial hair was neat and, if necessary, kept in place by "a fine netting
material the same color as the hair."
'1 84
The plaintiffs maintained that the Canadian Constitution's guarantee of
freedom of religion would be breached if members of the public were forced to
interact with police officers wearing, as part of a uniform, symbols of an
unshared religion. 185 They also argued that the plaintiffs' constitutional right to
fundamental justice required that police powers be exercised "in a context free
of any reasonable apprehension of bias.' ' 186 Finally, the plaintiffs claimed that
the revised dress code discriminated against other religious groups who were
not allowed to display their religious symbols.
18 7
The trial court's opinion, whose appeal was rejected by the Supreme Court
of Canada, did not analyze the relationship between Sikh identity and religious
emblems. Rather, it focused on the significance of the RCMP officers'
appearance and the implications of allowing officers to wear turbans and
beards. The court first recognized that the police officer with his typical cap
and uniform had become an icon that symbolized and personified Canada in the
minds of Canadians, as well as in governmental and tourist-oriented
publications.188 Yet, the court observed, the symbolic look had not been
stagnant but, rather, had adapted to changing social circumstances, as when it
had been necessary to deviate in order to accommodate women. 189 The court
182. [1995] 1 F.C. 158, affd, [1995] 125 D.L.R. 556, leave to appeal refused, [1996] 130 D.L.R. at
vii.
183. The lawsuit was initiated by wives of police officers and ex-officers. Their petition drives
drew more than 200,000 signatures. See id. 45, 48-50.
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then examined whether it would be appropriate, as a matter of Canada's
constitutional principles and political atmosphere, to exclude bearded and
turbaned Sikhs from police service. Rejecting the claim that the religious
freedom of the public would be infringed through interactions with turban-
wearing police officers, the court wrote:
In the case of interaction between a member of the public and a police
officer wearing a turban, I do not see any compulsion or coercion on
the member of the public to participate in, adopt or share the officer's
religious beliefs or practices. The only action demanded from the
member of the public is one of observation. That person will be
required to observe the officer's religious affiliation. I cannot conclude
that observation alone, even in the context of a situation in which the
police officer is exercising his law enforcement powers, constitutes an
infringement of the freedom of religion of the observer. 190
The quote posits an account of what it means to be Canadian and to live
with other Canadians of diverse affiliations and backgrounds. Most
interestingly, the court refuses to turn the matter into a clash between "true"
religious and ethnic identities, and leaves the issue at the terrain of appearance.
Surely, the court was aware that the basis of the plaintiffs' claim may have
been prejudice against foreigners. However, the court defused the identity-
based aspect of the case by refusing to frame the issue as one of identities in the
abstract and instead examined how identities function in the concrete social
interactions in question.
Had the court applied the approach of the cases examined in Part I, it might
have concluded that Sikhs could serve in the police force only if they refrained
from displaying symbols of their religious affiliation. Alternatively, the court
could have permitted the turban and the beard if these were strict religious
requirements. But like the Nof court, the Grant court saw no need to establish
that the turban was part of religious doctrine. The court focused not on whether
Sikh men were justified in wearing turbans and beards, but on whether the
plaintiffs (as members of the Canadian public) had legitimate grounds for
objecting to the idea of turban-wearing policemen. That some Sikhs saw these
practices as mere traditional customs, and that many Sikhs did not wear the
beard or the turban, had no bearing on the case's resolution.' 91 The decision
190. Id. 84 (emphasis added). The court recognized that this was a matter of the culture and
society in question. "[A]s a practical matter, in Canada, there is simply no chance that civil strife will be
created by allowing the wearing of the Khalsa Sikh turban by some of our police officers. We are a
highly tolerant society and perhaps more importantly, today, at least, highly secular." Id. 1 10. See also
id. 9 93 ("One can speculate that the tensions between Sikhs and others, at other times and on other
continents, simply do not pertain in Canada."); 99 59-65 (describing the fact that in the nineteenth
century, the police reformed the dress code in order to signal impartiality and neutrality, rather than their
political or religious affiliations).
191. Id. at 9 17 (analyzing the history of the Sikh dress code and noting that "[w]hether or not the
wearing of the turban is in fact mandatory is not free from debate"). Furthermore, the court relied on
evidence that the Sikh symbols are not necessarily perceived by the public as religious symbols, but as
"a cultural manifestation [that] signifies only a person coming from India." Id. 5. See also 92 ("It
[Vol. 19:49
Adjudicating Appearance
shifted its analysis from the Sikh's claim on his turban to the Canadian public's
ways of seeing. The court questioned the legitimacy of the plaintiffs'
expectations for simplicity and clarity in recognizing policemen, subtly asking
the plaintiffs to complicate and refine their habits of seeing. One could be both
a policeman and a Sikh, and the mature response to this fact would be to
accommodate this complexity rather than to long for a stable and plain visual
order. 1 92
Whereas the Sikh emblems in Grant were challenged because of their
symbolic interference with the police uniform, Dhillon v. British Columbia
193
involved a challenge on the functional ground that wearing a turban interferes
with wearing a motorcycle helmet, preventing compliance with Canada's
helmet requirement. In Dhillon, the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
accepted the claim of a Sikh complainant who argued that, by refusing to allow
him to take a novice road test on a motorcycle, the ministry of transportation
had discriminated against him based on his religion. A devout Sikh who felt
prevented from wearing anything on his head but a turban, the complainant
refused to wear the safety helmet required by the law. The tribunal found that
the helmet requirement had, in general, a bona fide reasonable justification'
94
but that its justification in the case of the Sikh population needed to be assessed
in context, based on specific empirical data. The tribunal gathered elaborate
data in order to calculate the marginal increase in risk and costs that might
result from waiving the helmet requirement for Sikhs. The analysis took into
account the baseline risk associated with motorcycling, the marginal risk
associated with driving a motorcycle without a helmet, and the marginal risk
resulting from the percentage of motorcycling turban-wearing Sikh men in the
population. The tribunal concluded that the risk increase would be so small
195
that it did not constitute undue hardship as a matter of medical cost or safety
promotion. 196 The tribunal said that risk was "ubiquitous":
may very well be that most Canadians... do not interpret the turban as a religious symbol or they may
see it as benign or as an indication of integrity and strength.").
192. The court rejected the two other claims using similar reasoning. As to the discrimination
claim, the court noted that the applicants did not demonstrate that members of other religions were
denied the opportunity to manifest their religion, and noted that the police were willing to consider any
requests for exemptions on religious grounds. Id. 98. The fundamental justice argument was rejected
along the same lines. See id. 92-93.
193. [1999] 35 C.H.R.R. D/293 (B.C. Hum. Rts. Trib.).
194. Under Canadian law, a bona fide justification can sustain a practice that is on its face
discriminatory. B.C. Hum. Rts. Code, R.S.B.C. § 8 (1996) (Can.).
195. The assessed increase in annual fatality rate would be between 0.02 percent and 0.16 percent,
and the assessed increase in annual brain and head injury rate would be between 0.16 percent and 1.07
percent. Meeting this increase would require 0.05 more rehabilitation beds annually. See Dhillon, 35
C.H.R.R. D/293 41, 50.
196. Cf Pannu v. Skeena Cellulose, [2000] B.C.H.R.T.D. No. 55 (QL) (denying a Sikh employee's
claim that he was discriminated against because his employer refused to allow him to keep his beard).
The plaintiff in Pannu worked with dangerous materials that required a gas mask in case of emergency.
The tribunal assessed the safety hazards involved in his inability to wear the safety mask, and concluded
that they overrode the plaintiff's right to religious equality.
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There is a risk involved in driving a car or flying an airplane. Whatever
the statistical probability of death or serious injury occurring, millions
of people continue to drive their cars and fly airplanes. As a society,
we are willing to accept these risks, and many others .... Clearly, in
licensing helmeted motorcycling, [the Ministry of Transportation] is
not governed by a policy of "zero tolerance" for injury and death.' 97
Whether the plaintiffs marker was volitional, habitual, or immutable was
of secondary importance for the tribunal. 198 The scrutiny turned away from the
turban-wearer and towards the rule barring him from wearing the turban. As in
Grant, the decision constructed an undisturbed circle in which the legal subject
could be marked as he chose. 199 Stronger proof of increase in risk or in cost
would be needed to justify an intervention in the protected circle of the Sikh's
identity.20 The tribunal focused on the importance of the personal markers to
the dignity and personhood of their litigants, and not on whether their identity
justified those markers.
Recently, the Supreme Court of Canada took a similar approach in a case
involving the right of a student to wear a kirpan (a traditional religious object
that resembles a small sword) to school sealed under his clothes. 20' The court
held that forbidding the student from carrying his kirpan would violate his
constitutional right to religious freedom. Two points are noteworthy for the
current discussion. First, the Court did not consider whether all orthodox Sikhs
carried a kirpan: "The fact that different people practice the same religion in
different ways does not affect the validity of the case of a person alleging that
his or her freedom of religion has been infringed.,
20 2
Second, the Court refused to analyze the meaning of the kirpan outside the
context in which it was used and the cultural meanings attached to it. The
school authorities argued that the kirpan was a weapon that presented a safety
hazard to the students in the school. They contended that even if it was not
actually used, "the kirpan is a symbol of violence and ... it sends the message
that the use of force is the way to assert rights and resolve conflicts." 20 3 The
Supreme Court rejected this interpretation, and dismissed the claim that
197. Dhillon, 35 C.H.R.R. D/293 43-45.
198. Cf Bhinder v. Canadian National Railway, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 561 (asserting that even if the
helmet requirement was a bone fide occupational qualification, it should still be examined in relation to
the individuals to which it applied, and that the Sikh employee should be accommodated).
199. "[T]he protection of fundamental rights is usually accompanied by costs, either financial or
otherwise. There is a cost associated with making buildings wheelchair accessible for persons with
disabilities .... The present case is not unique in this regard." Dhillon, 35 C.H.R.R. D/293 52.
200. Cf Bhatia v. Chevron USA, 734 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that an employer's refusal
to enable a Sikh employee to keep his beard when working in a toxic environment that required the
ability to wear a tight-face sealed respirator did not amount to religious discrimination).
201. Multani v. Commission Scholair Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256.
202. Id. 35. Recall that in Rogers, the plaintiff's claim that her cornrow hairstyle was significant
for her, was rejected based on the judicial observation that not all black women wear comrows, and that
some white women wear them too.
203. Id. 55.
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"whatever it may symbolize, the kirpan is still essentially a dagger, a weapon
designed to kill, intimidate or threaten others. 2 °4 The Court explained that such
an interpretation "strip[ped] the kirpan of any religious significance."2 °5 Rather
than extrapolating the kirpan's meaning from the object itself, the Court looked
to the meaning ascribed to it by its carriers. Thus, the Court noted that "the
word 'kirpan' comes from 'kirpa', meaning 'mercy' and 'kindness', and 'aan',
meaning 'honour,"' 20 6 and that "Sikh religion teaches pacifism and encourages
respect for other religions . . . the kirpan must be worn at all times, even in
bed.., and it must not be used as a weapon to hurt anyone., 20 7 This contextual
assessment of the meaning of personal markers was pivotal to the Court:
There is no denying that this religious object could be used wrongly to
wound or even kill someone, but the question at this stage of the
analysis cannot be answered definitively by considering only the
physical characteristics of the kirpan .... [T]he question of the
physical makeup of the kirpan and the risks the kirpan could pose to
the school board's students involves the reconciliation of conflicting
values .... 208
For the same reasons that schools do not ban other potentially dangerous
objects like scissors, it was inappropriate to ask that the kirpan be completely
devoid of risk.209 The appropriate solution was to take proportional measures to
decrease the potential safety hazard by setting specific rules for kirpan
wearing.210
C. An Alternative Approach to Appearance Claims
The above cases provide four principles that can serve as the foundation for
an alternative legal approach to appearance claims. All four principles have to
do with the modes through which we interpret appearance. They suggest that it
is hard to classify appearance as either completely instrumental or completely
symbolic, or as either a completely reliable reflection of one's identity or a
marker completely detached from identity.





209. Cf Peel Bd. of Educ. v. Ontario Hum. Rts. Comm., [1991] 3 O.R. (3d) 531 (confirming the
right of a school student to wear a kirpan to school, provided that it was securely sealed under the
student's clothes, and rejecting the safety hazard argument since no evidence of the usage of kirpan for
violent purposes was provided).
210. Cf Nijjar v. Canada 3000 Airlines Ltd., [1999] C.H.R.D. No. 3 (QL) (affirming an airline's
ban on wearing a kirpan aboard the plane). The Multani decision held that airplanes and airports are
different from schools, in that they are a unique environment, in which people stay only for limited
duration in a confined space. In this, they are substantially different from schools, which aspire to reflect
the values of the community. Multani, I S.C.R. 256 63.
2007]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
1. Maintaining a category-free protective circle around the person. The
cases we read do not ask the subjects of law to self-report about the identity
category that they occupy. Even if one wants to wear Sikh insignia because he
is Sikh, these courts do not question whether the person is really Sikh and
whether the insignia is inherent to Sikh identity. Accordingly, I suggest that
legal systems dealing with appearance cases should draw a "categorization-free
circle" around plaintiffs in appearance claims. This category-free protective
circle can be defined through liberty (for example, free speech or freedom of
religion), dignity, autonomy, or privacy. Every legal system should use the
concepts most fitting its own toolbox.
211
2. Recognizing that everybody impersonates. Since every individual
maintains personhood through appearance, the question that should interest the
law is not whether the petitioner impersonates, but whether the impersonation,
212including its poetic dimensions, is part of his or her personhood. In other
words, the question should be whether the appearance is essential in
maintaining one's sense of who one is, or rather, one's sense of "what one is
like."
As we saw in Nof, appearance can be a significant part of one's personhood
even if it is not anchored in a recognizable identity category. For a man who
has sported a beard for most of his adult life, and who recognizes himself and is
recognized by others with and through this physical characteristic, a beard
could be significant even if it could not be grounded in religious or other neatly
classifiable identities.
Appearance should be adjudicated in the context of personhood because
the concept of personhood already contains a recognition of the semiotic.
Personhood recognizes the masks that human existence entails-masks that,
when significant and part of personhood, are never completely detached from
their wearer (and are therefore not completely masks).
211. It is beyond the scope of this article to outline the doctrinal ways in which each legal system
could incorporate my suggested model into its treatment of appearance cases. 1 would like to note in
passing that U.S. law has recently demonstrated openness to recognizing certain life practices as
pertaining to dignity and autonomy. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003)
(recognizing the right to intimate relationships as part of personal dignity, which is part of the
constitutionally protected right to liberty); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 851 (1992) (recognizing personal decisions relating to marriage, parenthood, and family
relationships as a constitutionally protected aspect of personal dignity and autonomy); see also Maxine
D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740
(2006) (analyzing the usage of dignity in American constitutional law); R. George Wright, Dignity and
Conflicts of Constitutional Values: The Case of Free Speech and Equal Protection, 43 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 527 (2006) (reviewing the meaning of the concept of dignity in American constitutional case law).
212. [L]ike it or not, we are stuck with faking it. If we try to avoid it by refusing to don masks
or strip our veils we are only playing a role that has a lengthy and complex history, predating
the cynics, and ever so susceptible to hypocritical and false norms. Some accommodation
with faking it is in order .... [T]he attempts to get back to true basics mostly succumb to the
vanity of human wishes; they never quite measure up to the hopes we had for them.
WILLIAM IAN MILLER, FAKING IT 233-34 (2003).
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3. Questioning the legitimacy of an appearance's social rejection rather
than assessing its legitimacy. The cases in Part I are, in part, expressions of
social intolerance to appearances that resist neat classification into identity
categories. What, then, makes courts produce decisions reflecting a substantive
difference between everyday social uncertainties and the uncertainties that
"our" plaintiffs bring to the court, leading them to attend to the latter by
protecting against the uncertainty of appearance? Stated differently, what is it
that prompts courts to attend to social actors' frustrations about interpretive
uncertainty in reading appearances?
These decisions reflect the desire for a stable order of identities and
appearances. In contrast, the decisions discussed in Part II question the political
legitimacy of such a narrow approach to markers. Rather than legitimating the
social longing for a world in which identities are clearly distinct, these
decisions throw the question back at the anxious or impatient reader of the
appearance and require him or her to produce a convincing reason for the
negative response. James Boyd White writes: "When we discover that we have
in this world no earth or rock to stand or walk upon but only shifting sea and
sky and wind, the mature response is not to lament the loss of fixity but learn to
sail. 2 13 The opinions discussed in Part II tell the social actors who lament the
complexity of appearance to learn to sail. These judgments refuse to validate
the legitimacy of irritation about uncertainty of appearance.
The adjudication of appearance should not revolve so much around who
one is as much as about how one is perceived. For example, instead of asking
the Mexican asylum seeker to justify his appearance by reference to a "true"
identity, we should ask the Mexican police to account for their intolerance
towards his attire. It is their inability to accept that males wear feminine clothes
that prompted the plaintiffs persecution, not the plaintiffs "real" sexual
identity. It is their animosity and resentment that needs to be challenged, not
his "justifiable" or "unjustifiable" choice of clothing. What an asylum seeker
should have to establish to receive refuge is not that his (stable, clear, and
clinically proven) identity renders him a part of a persecuted social group, but
rather that he is socially perceived in his home country as belonging to that
social group.214
In Nof, the Court signaled that the State of Israel and its officials would
have to learn to live with the fact that beards may signal things other than
213. JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING 278 (1984).
214. Justice Blackmun's dissent in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), revealed a
similar approach to the one I suggest here. The Goldman majority held that it was not a violation of
religious freedom to prevent a religious Jewish air force sergeant from wearing the yarmulke required by
his faith. Justice Blackmun argued that the military had not provided any empirical proof of its claim
that religious garments would undermine military uniformity: "The Air Force simply has not shown any
reason to fear that a significant number of enlisted personnel and officers would request religious
exemptions that could not be denied on neutral grounds such as safety, let alone that granting these
requests would noticeably impair the overall image of the service." Id. at 527 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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religious belief. Consequently, policymakers will need to accept that secular
people's beards can be important to their bearers and to tolerate the risk that it
will be harder to determine whose beards are worthy of legal recognition. Such
judicial decisions signal an understanding that uncertainty about the meaning of
appearance is unavoidable, for where there are signs, there is uncertainty. My
contention is that courts should take part in alleviating such uncertainties only
when there are good reasons for doing so.
The cases discussed in Part II offer ways to protect appearance practices
when such protection is due, without trapping the subjects of this protection in
fixed and flat notions of identity. The courts in these cases manage to produce a
nuanced picture of identity (and of appearance) without losing identity's
usefulness in informing the legal understanding of the diverse perspectives of
the law's subjects. The central difference between the two groups of cases lies
in their approach to the kind of meaning produced by personal markers.
Here the metaphor of poetry becomes central. Just as the medium of poetry
is essential to what poetry does,215 markers are a medium where selfhood is not
expressed or projected but occurs. Appearance, some courts realize, does not
represent some essence that lies beneath it. Thus, unlike the identity-centered
decisions discussed in Part I, the decisions in Part II do not require that the
subject re-articulate his or her appearance in identity terms. As these decisions
convey, insisting on the propositions made by one's appearance would be just
as irrelevant as insisting upon the argument of a poem. Like poems, personal
markers marvel in the medium.
In taking this approach, the decisions I examined do not free markers or
their bearers of responsibility for the meaning of their appearance. They simply
shift the location of that meaning from what lies underneath the marker to the
terrain of the medium itself and its social functioning. These decisions reflect a




4. Accommodating the inherent multiplicity of appearance and examining
personal markers in context. According to the account produced by the
caselaw, markers function at one of two extremes: Either they are one's "real"
215. In the words of Brooks: "[F]orm and content, or content and medium, are inseparable. The
artist does not first intuit his object and then find the appropriate medium. It is rather in and through his
medium that he intuits the object." BROOKS, supra note 29, at 183. Far from being "transparent panels]
of glass through which the stuff of poetry is reflected, directly and immediately," poetic words function
through their rich materiality and as a function of their place in language. Poetic texts refuse to shift
their center of gravity to what lies behind the words; they refuse to dedicate themselves to the task of
reliable depiction of external referents, to mediation that aspires to minimize the distorting effect of
language. Id. at 203.
216. See BROOKS, supra note 29, at 69:
[N]ot only our reading of the poem is a process of exploration, but ... [the] process of
making the poem was probably a process of exploration too. To say that [the poet]
"communicates" certain matters to the reader tends to falsify the real situation .... [The poet]
explores, consolidates, and "forms" the total experience that is the poem.
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face or they are a mask. Ironically, however, the main work of a marker occurs
in the space between those two extremes. In fact, markers at either extreme are
no longer markers, because they lose their capacity to convey meaning.
Martin Hollins treats the way in which the mask and the self are
intertwined through the example of theater actors:
The relation of actors to the characters they play does not yield an easy
distinction of men from masks. We may be inclined to view actors as
donning and doffing masks like hats but that is not the only way to
conceptualise theatre .... Here the self cannot be the mask alone, as
the point of the analogy is to deny that we are merely being-for-others;
nor can it be the man alone, without destroying the analogy; so it must
be some fusion of man and mask, which therefore reinstates the initial
perplexity.
217
As we have seen throughout this Article, appearance is contested when it
invites uncertainty about how it should be read. It is only when appearance can
be classified neither as a mask nor as an inherent feature of one's identity that it
becomes appearance-a sign that can be read. It is only then that appearance
may end up at the center of a dispute, for resolution in a courtroom. The
intermediate space between intended and unintended appearance, or between
appearance as speech and appearance as status, is where markers reside-and
yet this is precisely the space denied by prevailing law. The law should discard
its nomenclature approach, according to which each legal subject has an
identity that should be correctly packaged and labeled.
In looking at its subjects, the law should operate more as a reader and less
as a decoder: It should approach personal markers as more tentative,
suggestive, and performative than instrumental, natural, or propositional.2 18
Identity is an ongoing project, not a static fact. Thus, it would be wrong to ask
whether an appearance reflects a preexisting identity.2 19 Just as identities are
too complex and open-ended to be captured by single-word nouns, appearances
never convey the kind of one-to-one labels of identity that the law seeks.
Playful and ambivalent gestures, multilayered collages of intersecting and
competing affiliations, allusions and experimentations-all characterize our
appearance practices. Such practices cannot be captured within a binary
formula of either true or false representations of identity.
217. Martin Hollins, Of Masks and Men, in THE CATEGORY OF THE PERSON, supra note 106, at
222.
218. This form of meaning-making is parallel to the way poetry acquires meaning:
The theory of communication throws the burden of proof upon the poet, overwhelmingly and
at once. The reader says to the poet: Here I am; it's your job to "get it across" to me-when
he ought to be assuming the burden of proof himself. Now the modem poet has, for better or
worse, thrown the weight of responsibility upon the reader. The reader must.., be prepared
to accept a method of indirection.
BROOKS, supra note 29, at 70-71.
219. Cf Yoshino, supra note 11, at 873 (asserting that the law should protect traits that are
constitutive of identity).
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Whereas the personhood-centered cases examine the meaning of
appearance in its context, the identity-centered cases examine a single marker,
artificially pulled out of its context. There is no room in these cases for the
entirety of the person's appearance, or for the broader context in which the
appearance operates and is read.22 ° Markers, like words, make sense in clusters;
the message that they carry cannot be read in isolation.221 The same blond wig
means markedly different things when worn by a cancer patient who has lost
her hair, an orthodox Jewish woman whose conventions of religious modesty
prevent her from exposing her natural hair in public, or a drag queen gesturing
towards heightened femininity. What could possibly be learned about the wig-
wearer, or about the meaning of the wig, if one were to examine the wig in
isolation, detached from the overall "look" and from the social context in which
it is WOM? 22 2 This is, however, the mode of examination in the majority of
appearance cases: The way legal subjects carry themselves and project
themselves to the world is dissected into such tiny pieces that each piece
becomes devoid of meaning and thus easy to render insignificant. In the cases
examined in Part II, by contrast, courts refused to turn the issue into one that
depends on the marker in isolation. The Canadian public, resenting the idea of
turban-wearing police officers in Grant, 223 was not allowed to assert, "We have
nothing against Sikhs, it is just that there should be tradition and uniformity in
police look." The court examined the turban in the context of the overall police
uniform. It also examined the issue within the concrete backdrop of Canadian
224society and political culture. Even an apprehension that seemed reasonable,
such as the Canadian government's concern for the safety of motorcycle riders
220. Cf JOSEPH ET AL., supra note 105, at 60-61(discussing linguist John Rupert Firth's approach
in which "linguistic forms are not ... in themselves containers of ideas or meaning: 'words do not in
any sense "hold" or "contain" or "express" the "meaning" shown against their written form in a
dictionary'... [A]ny sentence, as such, is an abstraction, and abstractions do not in themselves have
meaning. Meaning is to be sought in actual speech events embedded in particular 'contexts of
situation').
221. See WHITE, supra note 105, at 110-12 ("[W]ords in fact do not have stable and consistent prior
meaning, to be employed as units in the construction of the sentence, but change their meaning as they
are used. Indeed, it can be one of the most important functions of a sentence is to pint upon and redefine
the words with which it is made.").
222. As Mark Rahdert notes, Blackmun's dissent in Goldman v. Weinberg, 475 U.S. 503 (1986),
asserted that
[j]udging whether a particular religious practice is "unobtrusive," for example, invites
discrimination between what we think of as "normal" and "abnormal" religious conduct: a
turban would seem quite normal and unobtrusive in India, as would a saffron robe in
Southeast Asia, whereas against the background of this country's Judaeo-Christian traditions
those articles of religious clothing seem strange and stand out. Banning them on grounds that
they are "obtrusive" might well betray a hidden prejudice against the religions that prescribe
them.
Rahdert, supra note 12, at 39.
223. Grant v. Canada, [1995] 1 F.C. 158, affd, [1995] 125 D.L.R. 556, leave to appeal refused,
[1996] 130 D.L.R. at vii.
224. The court concluded that, in the context of Canada's political culture, the turban would not be
seen as a sectarian symbol that compromised the neutrality of the police.
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who do not wear helmets, was carefully assessed.225 The tribunal examined the
extent to which the helmet requirement was supported by data on the
connection between helmets and motorcycle injuries. The more promising
opinions, then, saw no point in thinking about the marker without considering
its concrete usage.
Personal markers have a semiotic function. As with any language, what
renders the language of markers meaningful is not which markers are used but
how they are invoked. Tone, mood, allusion, irony, inflection, rhythm-these,
not dictionary meanings (if there are any), are the significant elements of
markers.
If personal markers are subjected to reading by others, then, as we do with
poems, we should incorporate the social context in which the reading is done
into our understanding. The poetic reading of personal markers depends on its
interaction with a particular reader and grounded in time, place, and cultural
codes. Thus, we should not talk about the abstract or general meaning of the
marker but examine what the marker does in the social setting in which it is
invoked. The cases examined here, in short, develop a way of reading personal
markers poetically.
III. APPLICATION
A. How Would the Conceptual Tools Apply to Appearance Cases?
How should the cases of Rosa and Jespersen have been decided in light of
the principles described above? My contention is that the plaintiffs in Rosa and
Jespersen sought to maintain an appearance that should have been legally
recognized and protected, but on different grounds.
Like the bearded, secular petitioner in Nof, the problem of the plaintiff in
Jespersen was that she was unable to anchor her resistance to makeup in some
underlying identity. She was not gay (or more accurately, she did not claim to
be gay, nor was she classified by the court as gay) and she was not (or did not
claim to be) transgendered or a cross-dresser, but she still strongly felt that "it
wasn't her," or "wasn't like her" to wear makeup. In fact, she felt so strongly
that she would rather lose a job she had held for more than twenty years than
comply with the makeup requirement. The plaintiff in Jespersen clearly had a
personhood claim, of which her sex identity was a subset. She felt that wearing
makeup impinged on her personhood, because the extent to which she looked
feminine or masculine was pivotal to her sense of self. To find discrimination
on the basis of sex, it should have been sufficient to establish that, as a woman,
she was constricted to specific appearance requirements that violated her
225. Dhillon v. British Columbia, [1999] 35 C.H.R.R. D/293 (B.C. Hum. Rts. Trib.).
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personhood. Similarly, the Rosa court should not have asked whether or not the
plaintiff could be defined as a cross-dresser or transgendered, but whether it
was legitimate of the bank to prevent him from appearing in clothing perceived
as not matching his underlying sex. Once we realize that the dilemmas and
fragility of appearance are part of every identity and that personhood entails
impersonating, then we can see that the plaintiffs in both Rosa and Jespersen
had valid claims about the significance of their appearance to their sense of
self. Asking them to fit into identity categories that would match their
appearance ignores the pains of becoming and being a person, a social entity
whose body, speech, name, and other manners of being in the world
persistently operate as signs, ever subject to interpretation and reading.
In Rosa and Jespersen, the courts should have focused on the intolerant
response of the employer or the bank to the perceived mismatch between the
plaintiffs' identities and their appearance. The makeup in Jespersen and the
dress in Rosa should have been understood not according to their nexus with
their bearers, but according to their meaning in the semiotic field of
appearance. Re-invoking Martin Hollins, 226 it is "some fusion of man and
mask" that creates the person, and not the man or the mask alone.
Instead of asking whether the plaintiffs dress style fits his or her sex or
sexual identity, courts should ask the defendant to articulate the exact nature of
the appearance problem. Is there, for example, a cost or a burden connected
with enabling the plaintiff to appear as he or she wishes? Such an articulated
cost, if provided by the defendant, would then be assessed vis-A-vis the interest
of the plaintiff in leaving his appearance intact. Such interests could be based in
legal principles such as autonomy, expression, or the dignity of the marker-
bearer; each legal system should rely on terms that are coherent with its
jurisprudence. Indeed, Ninth Circuit judge Sidney Thomas, dissenting from an
earlier panel opinion in Jespersen, defined the cost of the makeup requirement
on women not only in terms of time and money, but also in terms of personal
dignity: Requiring women to wear "a uniform of makeup" is to require that
they abide by "outdated and impermissible sex stereotypes."
227
Recent developments in American adjudication indicate a potential
willingness to entertain this approach and see appearance as an aspect of
personhood. In Smith v. The City of Salem, the Sixth Circuit accepted the sex
discrimination claim of a transgendered firefighter. 22 The plaintiff argued that
he suffered an adverse employment action because of his feminine appearance
and behavior, because a similarly situated woman with feminine appearance
would have been treated differently. The trial court held that the plaintiff was
treated adversely because of his status as transsexual and not because of gender
226. See Hollins, supra note 217.
227. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1084 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
228. 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
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stereotyping. As the Sixth Circuit characterized it, "The district court implied
that Smith's claim was disingenuous, stating that he merely 'invokes the term-
of-art... that is, 'sex stereotyping,' as an end run around his 'real' claim,
which, the district court stated, was 'based upon his transsexuality."'
229
Criticizing previous caselaw that reflected logic similar to the district court's,
the Sixth Circuit stated:
[S]ome courts have held that this latter form of discrimination is of a
different and somehow more permissible kind. For instance, the man
who acts in ways typically associated with women is not described as
engaging in the same activity as a woman who acts in ways typically
associated with women, but is instead described as engaging in the
different activity of being a transsexual (or in some instances, a
homosexual or transvestite). Discrimination against the transsexual is
then found not to be discrimination "because of ... sex," but rather,
discrimination against the plaintiff's unprotected status or mode of self
identification. In other words, these courts superimpose classifications
such as "transsexual" on a plaintiff, and then legitimize discrimination
based on the plaintiff's gender non-conformity by formalizing the non-
conformity into an ostensibly unprotected classification.
230
This reasoning moves away from the prevailing judicial tendency to diagnose a
plaintiffs status or identity as a means for deciding whether his or her
appearance is coherent with that identity. The judicial inquiry remains in the
level of social interaction, for this is where the discrimination occurs. It reflects
a realization that the plaintiff should not bear the burden of convincing the
court that he has a well-established or medically-recognized justification for
appearing a certain way. Rather, the defendant who exhibits intolerance should
be required to provide good reasons for this intolerance.
B. How Would the Conceptual Tools Apply to Appearance Claims of Minority
Group Members?
How should the court have approached the Rogers case23 if not by
concentrating on the connection between the comrow hairstyle and its
signification of racial identity? A more productive reading of the comrows
would have shifted the focus from what the hairstyle was supposed to signify
(racial identity) to the place and meaning of the cornrows within the hairstyle
repertoire 232 in which Rogers operated (for example, its position between afro
229. Id. at 571.
230. Id. at 574 (emphasis added). The judgment's strongly critical language adds that the district
court accounted for the plaintiffs contra-gender behavior "only insofar as it confirmed for the court
Smith's status as a transsexual." Id.
231. See discussion supra Part I.C.
232. Cf Derek Attridge, Closing Statement: Linguistics and Poetics in Retrospect, in THE
STYLISTICS READER: FROM ROMAN JAKOBSON TO THE PRESENT 36, 38 (Jean Jacques Weber ed., 1996)
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and "relaxed" hair and its relation to the "pony tails and shag cuts" invoked by
233Rogers as hairstyles permitted in her workplace).
Reading Rogers's hairstyle for its truth-value is like reading poetic texts in
order to gain information or to establish their truth or falsity. The reading
misses what they do. For Brooks, the attempt to measure poems by their truth-
value is a "heresy of paraphrase." If we allow ourselves to be misled by this
heresy, "we distort the relation of the poem to its 'truth,' we raise the problem
of belief in a vicious and crippling form, we split the poem between its 'form'
and its 'content'-we bring the statement to be conveyed into an unreal
competition with science or philosophy or theology." 234 To ask what single,
solid piece of information we can establish about the plaintiff by her act of
styling her hair flattens the complexity and tentativeness of this act. It also
ignores the rich materiality of the hair, and suppresses a whole array of factors
that are essential to establishing its meaning, such as the context and manner in
which it was invoked. The questions that should be considered according to my
suggested approach include whether the rest of the plaintiff's appearance was
"professional," and whether the cornrows were employed ironically, playfully,
or defiantly. However, in the account emerging from the judicial opinion, we
are not supposed to care or show interest in such questions of tone and nuance.
This judicial stipulation that cornrows should be protected only if they index
racial identity in a one-to-one relationship of referentiality produces a flat and
erroneous account of how markers such as hairstyle receive their meaning.
Similarly, in Garcia v. Gloor the court posits that only first-generation
immigrants from Mexico are native Spanish speakers who can argue that their
connection to the Spanish language should be legally recognized and protected.
I propose that we aspire to adopt legal and political arrangements that discharge
people such as the plaintiff in Garcia, a second-generation immigrant, from the
need to establish that his biographical facts warrant his everyday usage of
Spanish.
The identity narrative emerging from Garcia (and from most current law)
is one in which we use language and signs of appearance only to reflect a pre-
existing identity. However, it is impossible to expect that individuals will not
use performance and appearance, including the use of a particular language, to
maintain their personhood. The law should enable people to signify themselves
through speech as part of their right to develop their personhood, including the
relationship of that personhood to a national or cultural origin.
("Poetry is distinguished by its self-referentiality, which takes precedence over all the other operations
performed by its language.").
233. See Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
234. BROOKS, supra note 29, at 184.
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CONCLUSION
An old joke asks: "Why do firefighters wear a red belt?-So that their
pants won't fall offl" What makes this joke both funny and irritating is the
puzzlement we experience in determining the meaning of the belt. This vague
area between appearance's instrumental function and its symbolic value is at
the center of the cases discussed in this Article. Whether the firefighter likes it
or not, his or her belt prompts an observer to wonder about the meaning of its
color. I do not know why firefighters' uniforms are red, but I still take note of
the color and assume that there is some meaning to it.
This longing to escape being read through appearance is an inherent part of
being human in society. Much of the human experience can be described as an
ongoing attempt to mitigate the pains involved in the gap we experience
between who we understand ourselves to be and how we are perceived
outwardly.235 The cases studied here suggest that we cannot escape such
meaning-making and meaning-ascription by our mere presence in the social
world as concrete, embodied entities.
In one of her poems, Denise Riley describes the frustration of reading her
poetry in public and wishes that the poem could transcend its reader to reach
the audience without the mediation of her body: "If, if only/ I need not have a
physical appearance!, 236  Similarly, Margaret Atwood articulates the
unattainable wish that clothes be celebrated without their semiotic weight and
merely through the joy of color, fabric, and design:
My sister and I are sewing/ a red shirt for my daughter... Children
should not wear red,! a man once told me./ Young girls should not
wear red.!! In some countries it is the color/ of death; in others
passion,/ in others war, in others anger/ in others the sacrifice// of shed
blood... The shirt we make is stained with our words, our stories...
My/ daughter, I would like your shirt to be just a shirt,/ no charms or
fables. But fables/ and charms swarm here.
23'
As both poets demonstrate, fragility and vulnerability are inherent in
having a body and a social persona. This Article argues that the current law
does a poor job in accommodating this basic human state and in responding to
it with due care.
In discussing my alternative approach with colleagues, the conversation
often turns to extreme, implausible, or bizarre appearance claims. I am asked,
for example, whether I think employers should allow employees to come to
235. Jerrold Seigel describes this sense of a gap between one's sense of self and one's outward
performance, and he considers conforming to cultural demands a central part of selfhood. See SEIGEL,
supra note 8, at 25-26; see also Meyers, supra note 85, at 202 (discussing the danger of a psychological
crisis when there is no match between one's self-perception and one's external circumstances).
236. DENISE RILEY, Dark Looks, in SELECTED POEMS 74 (2000).
237. Margaret Atwood, A Red Shirt, in A SECOND SKIN: WOMEN WRITE ABOUT CLOTHES 144-48
(Kirsty Dunseath ed., 1998).
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work with purple hair, or whether my approach means that anybody could walk
around naked, or whether people claiming that they practice a new religion
could ask the law to recognize their belief that their genitals should not be
covered. Considering such radical cases is a good philosophical tool for
examining the scope and nature of an idea. But I think it is unwarranted, at least
at this stage. The cases that arrive in court raise much more mundane and
straightforward questions of appearance. They involve reasonable people who
recount stories of the fragility of having a social presence and a concrete
appearance. The concrete and minute details of our bodies, our movements, our
style of dress, our manner of speech, and other forms of manifestation mediate
our relations with others and our understanding of ourselves.
Our legal arrangements should respond to the social pains involved in
having an appearance. The cases reviewed here challenge the law to
accommodate the complexity and vulnerability of appearance's meaning
without subjecting it to an interpretive framework that seeks clear-cut answers
and singular meaning. Incorporating into the law an understanding of
appearance as the poetics of personhood would achieve this goal.
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